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Abstract
Due to the growing sophisticated capabilities of advanced persistent cyber threats,
it is necessary to understand and accurately assess cyber attack damage to digital assets.
This thesis proposes a Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment (DCBDA) process
which utilizes the comprehensive understanding of all possible cyber attack
methodologies captured in a Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL). This
research proposes CAMEL to provide detailed knowledge of cyber attack actions,
methods, capabilities, forensic evidence and evidence collection methods. This product
is modeled as an attack tree called the Cyber Attack Methodology Attack Tree
(CAMAT). The proposed DCBDA process uses CAMAT to analyze potential attack
scenarios used by an attacker. These scenarios are utilized to identify the associated
digital forensic methods in CAMEL to correctly collect and analyze the damage from a
cyber attack. The results from the experimentation of the proposed DCBDA process
show the process can be successfully applied to cyber attack scenarios to correctly assess
the extent, method and damage caused by a cyber attack.
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DEFENSIVE CYBER BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
THROUGH ATTACK METHODOLOGY MODELING

I. Introduction
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every victory
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,
you will succumb in every battle."
- Sun Tzu

1.1.

Motivation
In all manners of warfare, one must know how the enemy can attack in order to

defend. This knowledge can be gained through warfare planning which considers all
aspects of the enemy's capabilities and methods of attack. This planning is accomplished
through the detailed analysis of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) an attacker
has at their disposal. Comprehension of an adversary's attack methodology is pivotal for
successful warfare. Without knowing how an enemy can attack, one cannot effectively
plan to posses the ability to defend against the attack.
Motivated attackers exist and have the means to penetrate and cause damage to a
computer network. A recent example of this nefarious ability is the 2009 cyber attack on
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Google. This highly sophisticated and narrowly targeted attack on Google's corporate
infrastructure originated from China and resulted in the theft of intellectual property
[Dru10].

This attack, codenamed Operation Aurora, utilized a previously unknown

vulnerability exploit in Microsoft Internet Explorer aimed at specific targets through
tailored emails [Mca10]. The exploit then downloaded and activated malware within the
systems.

Malware is defined as software designed and/or deployed by adversaries

without the consent or knowledge of the user in support of adversarial missions
[DOD09]. The attack, which was initiated surreptitiously when targeted users accessed a
reputable appearing web page, ultimately connected those computer systems to a remote
malicious server. The targeted nature of the attack actions and level of attack method
sophistication of Operation Aurora are what garnered the attacker's success. This attack
also raised awareness to the advanced abilities of today's cyber attacker.
Another example of a sophisticated targeted cyber attack is Stuxnet. Stuxnet was
a malware attack which targeted a specific industrial control system, likely in Iran
[FMC10] [MRH10]. These control systems operate critical national assets such as gas
pipelines or power plants. The apparent goal of Stuxnet was to sabotage the industrial
facility by modifying the control systems to operate outside of their operational limits
resulting in damage to the facility's capabilities [FMC10]. Stuxnet is considered the most
technologically sophisticated malware developed to date [MRH10]. This malware shows
how modern cyber attackers are using targeted, sophisticated and capable attack
methodologies.
These examples show that anyone who uses computer networks must assume that
exploitable vulnerabilities exist and will be leveraged for unauthorized use. Simply put,
2

the enemy will attack, and will have success. Continued network operational success is
only possible through the ability to identify an attack, assess damage and defend against
attacks.
Cyber attack damage assessment forms the foundation for the key mission impact
questions of today's information technology-dependant leaders. Leaders need to know
the impact of an attack on the assets they control. This impact assessment depends on
accurate and timely information from a detailed technical damage assessment of an
attack. The attack assessment must pinpoint exactly what happened to the friendly
targeted systems to ensure the mission impact derived from the assessment is as accurate
as possible.
Knowing how the enemy can attack before they do so allows for a targeted
detailed assessment of damage after the attack has occurred. The intelligence preparation
of damage assessment through cyber attack methodology analysis is the most reliable
way to conduct active cyber damage assessments. These defensive assessments identify
technical damage post cyber attack. This attack assessment process, known as Defensive
Cyber Battle Damage Assessment (DCBDA), is vital.

1.2.

Research Statement
The goal of this research is to provide robust DCBDA capabilities through digital

forensic analysis tailored by an understanding of known cyber attacks. The ability to
detect and assess an attack at any level of progress is vital to the successful operation of a
digital network. The studied abilities of the sophisticated cyber attacker show the likely
probability that attacks will have some level of success. It is crucial for an organization
3

to possess the ability to determine what damage a cyber attack has caused to assets in
their control. This critical need to perform accurate, timely and comprehensive cyber
attack damage assessment is the motivation of this research.

1.3.

Research Approach
The ability to provide robust DCBDA can best be accomplished through a

thorough, complete understanding of the attacker methodology. This research proposes a
DCBDA process which is comprised of two phases: a preparation phase and a forensic
analysis phase.
The first phase relies on the defender's preparatory ability to understand, model,
translate and analyze the actions and methods of the cyber attacker. The purpose of this
phase is to use the prepared comprehensive knowledge of the complete cyber attack
methodology to pinpoint exact information needed to correctly identify damage for an
active attack event assessment.
The second phase of the DCBDA process is forensic analysis. This phase uses
the information identified in the preparation phase to conduct a digital forensic analysis
to identify evidence of actual attack damage. Cross-referencing identified evidence with
known cyber attack information will reveal probable attack techniques. Once the most
probable attack techniques are identified, DCBDA can be much more accurately
estimated and reported.
In order for the preparation phase of the DCBDA process to contain the
comprehensive knowledge of the actual attack under assessment, this research proposes
the Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL). CAMEL is the detailed
4

comprehensive listing of the complete cyber attack methodology to include every known
attack action, attack action capability metric, attack method, forensic evidence marker,
and forensic evidence collection method. This data is collected from researching the
known set of all cyber attacker TTPs. Possible sources for the attacker TTPs are forensic
analysis white papers, ethical hacker documentation, real world reports, and personal
experiences. Data in the CAMEL is used to create an attack tree modeled as the Cyber
Attack Methodology Attack Tree (CAMAT). The CAMAT is used by the DCBDA to
analyze attack scenarios and possible evidence for an attack event. The diagram in
Figure 1 is a high level view of the phases of the DCBDA process which shows the data
flow from the CAMEL/CAMAT.

Figure 1. Proposed DCBDA Process.

This approach is broken down into three key objectives for focused effort:
(1) Develop CAMEL and CAMAT creation process
(2) Develop the DCBDA process
(3) Verify the DCBDA process
5

1.3.1. Develop CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Process
This objective develops the process to create the CAMEL and CAMAT products.
This process outlines the steps required to collect, record and analyze the data which
make up these products.
1.3.2. Develop the DCBDA Process
This objective seeks to design a defensive cyber technical battle damage
assessment process which utilizes the CAMEL and CAMAT products. This process
outlines the steps required to assess an attack event which identifies the forensic evidence
of the attack's technical battle damage.
1.3.3. Verify the DCBDA Process
This objective seeks to verify the success the DCBDA process proposed in this
thesis by performing DCBDA against experimental test systems. Experimental success is
represented by the degree to which evidence gathered from the assessment correctly
identifies the cyber attacks executed against the test systems. Success demonstrates that
the proposed DCBDA process can reliably answer the following questions:
•

Did an attack occur?

•

What potential impact did the attack have?

•

What TTPs were used in the attack?

6

1.4.

Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the research effort, including topic

motivation, research statement, research approach and objectives, and the document's
organization.
Chapter 2 provides background information on computer security incident
analysis and the forensic analysis processes and types. Also discussed are computer
taxonomies, the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process,
attack modeling and related work.
Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology.

First, the methodology

overview is covered. Next, the approach to build the CAMEL and CAMAT is described.
Then the approach for the Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment process is
detailed. The design for the experiment methodology to test DCBDA is then discussed.
Chapter 4 presents the details of the experiments and results. This Section covers
the creation of CAMEL and CAMAT, the DCBDA process and the verification of the
DCBDA process through experimentation.
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the results, conclusions made from the study as
well as recommendations for future work.

7

II. Background
This chapter covers the fundamental concepts and related work of cyber battle
damage assessment research.

Section 2.1 details the steps involved in a computer

security incident analysis. Section 2.2 discusses the forensic analysis processes and
types. Section 2.3 discusses different computer attack taxonomies. Section 2.4 covers
the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process. Section 2.5
discusses attack modeling. Section 2.6 discusses related work.

2.1.

Computer Security Incident Analysis Process
There are many definitions on what comprises a computer security incident and

the process to handle the event. For the purposes of this thesis, the reference source for
this topic will be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01A,
Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense (CND) Volume I (Incident
Handling Program) which provides guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD)
Incident Handling Program [DOD09]. This document acknowledges the adversary threat
cannot be completely eliminated and will likely evolve over time. Therefore it is crucial
to maintain a proactive, progressive, and coordinated approach to detecting and
responding to events and incidents that can adversely affect DOD networks and systems
[DOD09].
The DOD Incident Handling Program is part of the overall CND actions to
protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within the DOD
computer networks.

The program outlines the methodology to provide a general
8

standardized process that establishes the intent and requirements for detecting, analyzing,
and responding to information or technology events or incidents for the purpose of
mitigating any adverse operational or technical impact on DOD critical data assets,
systems, and networks. [DOD09]. Part of the incident handling methodology process is
the incident analysis phase which is discussed in this Section.
2.1.1. Incident Analysis
Incident analysis is a series of analytical steps taken to identify what happened
from an incident. The purpose of incident analysis is to determine and characterize the
technical details, root causes, and potential impact of the incident. This understanding
will help determine what additional information to gather, coordinate information sharing
with others, and develop a course of action for response. This activity relies on effective
acquisition, preservation, and timely reporting of incident data [DOD09]. The primary
objectives for this phase include:
•

Identifying the root cause(s) of the incident through technical analysis

•

Ensuring the accuracy and completeness of incident reports

•

Characterizing and communicating the potential impact of the incident

•

Systematically capturing the methods used in the attack and the security controls
that could prevent future occurrences

•

Researching actions that can be taken to respond to and eradicate the risk and/or
threat

•

Understanding patterns of activity to characterize the threat and direct protective
and defensive strategies

9

2.1.2.

Incident Analysis Methodology

This Section details the steps required for an incident analysis. The steps are:
gathering information, validate the incident, determine attack vector, determine system
weaknesses, identify root causes, determine impact, research and develop courses of
action (COAs), coordinate with others and perform correlation and trending.

2.1.2.1. Gather information

In this step the objective is to identify and collect all relevant information about
the incident for use in the analysis of the incident [DOD09]. Information gathered may
include data previously acquired and preserved, external logs, personal accounts, allsource intelligence, technical information, or the current operational situation.

2.1.2.2. Validate the incident

In this step the objective is to review, corroborate, and apply applicable updates to
the reported incident to ensure all information is accurate. Related documents should be
reviewed and updated to maintain situational awareness, to add relevant data to
incomplete information, or to fix erroneous information. Report validation may require
the review of available sources of information, such as trusted network and system logs
of affected systems, to determine if the suspected activities happened as reported. In this
step it is also important to verify the incident is categorized properly [DOD09].
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2.1.2.3. Determine attack vector(s)

The data gathered in the previous steps is analyzed to determine the attack
vector(s) used by the attacker(s). An attack vector is the primary path or method used by
the adversary to cause the incident or event to occur.

Attack vectors are used to

systematically record major classes of attack methodologies used by adversaries, but do
not identify the system-specific root causes of an incident [DOD09]. If more than one
attack vector is identified, the attack vectors used by the threat actor must be
distinguished as either primary or secondary. For example, use of socially engineered email delivering a malicious payload exploiting a known vulnerability that was
preventable [DOD09]. The primary attack vector was the payload delivered by the
socially engineered secondary attack vector

Attack vectors should be assessed in

accordance with Appendix A. This annex describes the some of the possible major
categories and sub-categories of attack vectors. The annex should be used for assigning
attack vectors to reportable events or incidents [DOD09].

2.1.2.4. Determine system weaknesses

In this step the objective is to analyze the gathered information from the previous
steps to determine any underlying system weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or security controls
that could have prevented or mitigated the impact of the incident. Identification of
system weaknesses is a process used to systematically record and categorize major
classes of security controls that could prevent similar incidents from occurring in the
future [DOD09].
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2.1.2.5. Identify root cause(s)

In this step the objective is to analyze the collected information to determine the
system-specific base causes of the incident.

This identification expands upon the

identified attack vectors and system weaknesses by precisely identifying the sets of
conditions allowing the incident to occur. For example, an attack vector may identify a
system lacking current Operating System (OS) patches. This is useful for correlation and
trending, but is insufficient in identifying the specific cause of the incident and
preventing against future occurrences.

Root cause identification would determine

missing patches or system configurations that allowed the incident to occur [DOD09].

2.1.2.6. Determine impact

The objective of this step is to analyze the information gathered to validate and
expand the impact assessment. Impact is assessed based on the degree to which an
incident or event adversely affects, or has the potential to affect, the successful
accomplishment of operational missions of systems and networks. In determining the
actual impact, the current and potential impact of the incident or event on the
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of organizational operations, organizational
assets, or individuals should be considered [DOD09].

Types of impact are either

technical or operational.
Technical Impact (TI) refers to the incident’s detrimental impact on the technical
capabilities of the organization. TI typically refers to impacts on the network or system
machines directly or indirectly affected by the incident. Operational Impact (OI) refers to
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detrimental impacts on an organization’s ability to perform its mission. This may include
direct and/or indirect effects that diminish or incapacitate system or network capabilities,
the compromise and/or loss of mission critical data, or the temporary or permanent loss
of mission critical applications or systems [DOD09].

2.1.2.7. Research and Develop COAs

This step is focused on the identification of actions necessary to respond to the
reportable event or incident, fix the system, and assess the risk for the system or network
[DOD09]. Here multiple incident response COAs are developed and the best choice is
selected.

2.1.2.8. Coordinate with Others

An organization must work with other involved parties to collect additional
information, obtain assistance and additional expertise or guidance, and notify
appropriate operational and technical channels regarding changes in the status of
reportable events, incidents, and incident handling activities.

Timely interagency

coordination and deconfliction of operations is crucial to conducting an effective incident
response [DOD09].

2.1.2.9. Perform Correlation and Trending

In this step the objective is to analyze and identify relationships and trends
between incidents in the short term. A special focus on patterns is placed across long
term incidents.

Effective and complete reporting throughout the incident handling
13

lifecycle assures that the DOD has the ability to conduct and identify these trends and
patterns [DOD09].

2.2.

Digital Forensics Analysis
Digital forensics is the application of science to the identification, collection,

examination, and analysis, of data while preserving the integrity of the information and
maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data [NIS06]. Chain of custody is a log of
evidence possession and correlating time information.

The most common goal of

performing forensics analysis is to gain a better understanding of an event of interest by
finding and analyzing the facts related to that event [NIS06]. Listed in this Section are
some of the various types of forensic analysis types and the basic phases of the forensic
analysis process.
2.2.1. Computer System Forensic Analysis
System analysis is the identification, acquisition, examination and analysis of all
information from or about the affected computer systems to further incident analysis and
understand the full scope of the incident [DOD09].

The system information to be

analyzed typically includes anything which can help characterize the incident and
develop courses of action.

Examples of system information are various logs, files,

configuration settings, records of currently logged on users, past connections (logins),
running processes, open files, and changes to files or system settings (access control lists
(ACLs), registries, permissions) [DOD09].

Particular attention must be given to

preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody.
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2.2.2. Malware Forensic Analysis
Malware analysis is the process of identifying, analyzing, and characterizing
reported software suspected of being malicious [DOD09]. This analysis of suspected
malicious software is an essential step in determining the full scope of an incident.
Malware analysis can be performed at varying degrees of depth in detail. Depending on
the complexity of the malware and depth of analysis required, the time necessary to
complete the request can vary from minutes to hours to months [DOD09].
2.2.3. Network Forensic Analysis
Network forensic analysis is the process of collecting, examining, and interpreting
network traffic to identify and respond to events that violate an organization's security
policy [DOD09]. This analysis is conducted on the assets and resources attached to the
network or the network infrastructure. Network analysis reveals an adversary’s use of
network resources, uncovers the network interactions that occurred during an incident,
and aids in discovering other affected or vulnerable systems.
2.2.4. Forensic Analysis Process
This Section describes the basic phases of the forensic analysis process:
collection, examination, analysis, and reporting. This process is depicted in Figure 2.

2.2.4.1. Collection

The first phase in the forensic analysis process is to identify, label, record, and
acquire data from the possible sources of relevant data, while following guidelines and
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procedures that preserve the integrity of the data [NIS06].

Collection is typically

performed in a timely manner because of the likelihood of losing dynamic data such as
current network connections, as well as losing data from volatile devices.

Data

acquisition of the identified data sources for the collection phase of the forensic analysis
process should be performed using a three-step process: developing a plan to acquire the
data, acquiring the data, and verifying the integrity of the acquired data [NIS06].

Figure 2. The Forensic Analysis Process [NIS06].

2.2.4.2. Examination

After the data has been collected, the next phase is to examine the data. This
involves forensically processing the potentially large amounts of collected data using a
combination of automated and manual methods to assess and extract data of particular
interest, while preserving the integrity of the data analyzed [NIS06]. The extracted data
is then further analyzed using forensic tools and techniques appropriate to the type of
information collected.
16

2.2.4.3. Analysis

The next phase of the process is to analyze and interpret the results of the
examination, using legally justifiable methods and techniques. The objective of this
analysis is to derive useful information which forms conclusions to the questions that
were the impetus for performing the collection and examination [NIS06].

2.2.4.4. Reporting

The final phase of the forensic process is reporting the results of the conducted
analysis. This report may include describing the actions used and explaining how tools
and procedures were selected. Determining what other actions need to be performed such
as a forensic examination of additional data sources, securing identified vulnerabilities,
and improving existing security controls should also be reported in this phase. The
formality and verbosity of the reporting step varies greatly depending on the situation
[NIS06].

2.3.

Computer Attack Taxonomy
In the effort to understand the digital computer attack, it is useful to understand

the process of the attack which is being studied. In order to do this efficiently, it is
worthwhile to classify the distinct elements which make up the attack. This classification
allows research efforts to focus on distinct areas of the attack in great detail. A common
method for doing this in computer science is with a taxonomy. Taxonomy is the process,
or science, of a classification scheme that partitions a body of knowledge and defines the
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relationship of the pieces [Bos02]. Classification is the process of using a criterion for
ordering information into groups or categories.

Originally used for classifying

organisms, the principles of the classification process apply to computer security incident
research via taxonomy. There are many characteristics of taxonomy, and a small set of
those is listed below [Amo94]:
•

Mutually exclusive. Classification in one category excludes all others

•

Exhaustive. Taken together, the categories include all possibilities

•

Unambiguous. Data should be clear and precise so that classification is not
uncertain, regardless of who is classifying

•

Repeatable. Repeated applications result in the same classification

•

Accepted. Logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved
through review

•

Useful. The process can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry
2.3.1. Target-Centric Ontology for Intrusion Detection
In 2002 Undercoffer and Pinkston from the University of Maryland Baltimore

County defined a target-based ontology for intrusion detection [UnP02]. In this paper
they devise a simple taxonomy and from it develop their ontology. They argue that
ontologies provide software systems with the ability to share a common understanding of
the information at issue in turn enabling the software system with a greater ability to
reason over and analyze this information [UnP02]. What is unique, outside of their focus
on ontology, is that their model is target centric. Their developed ontology is a model of
computer attacks categorized by: the system component targeted, the means and
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consequence of attack, and the location of the attacker [UnP02]. This Section focuses on
their efforts to define attack taxonomy.
Their research states that an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has no knowledge
of the attacker’s motivation or the tools employed to conduct the attack. The IDS needs
to focus on evaluating the attack information which it has the ability to observe. Their
taxonomy is classified from the point of view of an IDS according to features and
characteristics directly observable at the target. The first section for the taxonomy is the
system component targeted by the attack. Table 1 breaks down how the taxonomy
defines the categories of targets.
Table 1. Target of Attack Categories [UnP02].
Target
Network

Explanation
The attack is inclusive of the layers of the
protocol stack, but does not leave the
protocol stack
KernelA process executing as part of the
Space
operating system, either compiled into the
kernel or a module that is loaded into and
executed by the kernel
Application An application running outside of kernel
space
Other
Any component not included above

Example
SynFlood attack

Heap overflow

Apache Web Server Chunk
Handling vulnerability
Printers, modems, etc.

The next section of the target-centric taxonomy is the means of attack. The
means of attack categories are summarized in Table 2. This category is further divided as
input validation, exploits and configuration. Input validation vulnerabilities exists if
some type of malformed input is received by a hardware or software component and is
not properly bounded or checked. Exploits are vulnerabilities such as race conditions or
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undefined states in a hardware or software component that lead to performance
degradation and/or system compromise. Configuration vulnerabilities exist due to an
improper state adjustment to a software program.
Table 2. Means of Attack Categories [UnP02].
Category
Input
Validation

Type
Buffer Overflow
Boundary
Condition Error
Malformed
Input

Exploits

Exceptional
Condition
Race Condition
Serialization
Error
Atomicity Error

Configuration

General

Description
Overflow of a static-sized data structure.
A process attempts to read or write beyond a valid
address boundary or a system resource is
exhausted
A process accepts syntactically incorrect input,
extraneous input fields, or the process lacks the
ability to handle field-value correlation errors
An error resulting from the failure to handle an
exceptional condition generated by a functional
module or device
An error occurring during a timing window
between two operations
An error that results from the improper
serialization of operations
An error occurring when a partially-modified data
structure is used by another process
Vulnerabilities that result from some misconfiguration or lack of proper configuration

The taxonomy outlines the consequences and locations of attacks. The categories
for the consequences of attacks are listed in Table 3. The consequences of an attack are
the end results of the attack.
The location of an attack is the physical location of the attacker. The location
categories are outlined in Table 4. These categories are indicated by whether the attacker
is connected via the network or local host.
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Table 3. Consequence Categories [UnP02].
Category
Denial of Service
(DoS)
User Access
Root Access
Loss of
Confidentiality
Other

Description
The attack results in a Denial of a Service to the users of the
system
The attack results in the attacker having access to some services
on the target system
The attack results in the attacker having complete control of the
system
The attack results in the users of the system loosing privacy of
their data
The attack results in the compromise of data integrity or other
undesirable characteristic

Table 4. Location Categories [UnP02].
Category

Description

Remote

The attacker does not need to be “virtually” present at the target

Local

The attacker needs to be “virtually” present at the target

Remote/Local

The attacker may be either local or remote to the target

2.3.2. The Howard Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy
Starting as a thesis for a PhD at Carnegie Mellon University and later refined as a
Sandia National Laboratories report, Howard introduced a computer security incident
taxonomy [How97] [HoL98]. Figure 3 represents the entirety of the taxonomy. The
taxonomy breaks down a computer and network incident into three main parts; the
attacker, the attack(s) and the objective. The taxonomy then further adds fidelity to the
nature and makeup of an attack. This taxonomy can be classified as a process schema
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attack taxonomy. It is important to note that the terms enumerated for the categories in
the taxonomy are not intended as a comprehensive dictionary of terms.

Figure 3. Howard Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy [HoL98].

An attack on a computer or network can be classified as an incident. Figure 4
depicts the three parts of an incident and how one or more attacker achieves their
objectives. An incident can be defined as a group of attacks that can be distinguished
from other attacks because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, objectives, sites
and timing [HoL98]. The attack may be prosecuted by only one attacker or a group of
several attackers related by some objective or other means.

From an operational

viewpoint, an attacker on a computer attempts to reach their ultimate objectives though
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some "means, ways, and ends" that connect the attacker to the objective [How97]. The
means used by the attacker are the tools, access and results an attacker achieves.

Figure 4. Simplified Computer and Network Incident [HoL98].

2.3.2.1. Attacker

Howard defines an attacker as an individual who attempts one or more attacks in
order to achieve an objective. Table 5 lists the categories of attackers used by Howard.

Table 5. Howard's Attacker Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Hackers

For challenge, status or the thrill of obtaining access

Spies

For information to be used for political gain

Terrorists

Cause fear for political gain

Corporate Raiders

Attack competitor's computers for financial gain

Professional Criminals

Personal financial gain

Vandals

Cause damage

Voyeur

Thrill of obtaining sensitive information
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2.3.2.2. Attack

An attack is a series of steps taken by an attacker to produce an event which
achieves an unauthorized result [HoL98]. Howard's taxonomy breaks down an attack
into five parts: tool, vulnerability, action, target, and unauthorized result.
The first two steps in an attack, the tool and vulnerability, are used to create an
event on a computer or network system. A category listing of tools can is shown in Table
6. A list of vulnerabilities and their descriptions are found in Table 7. During an attack,
an attacker uses a tool to exploit a vulnerability that causes a desired action against a
target. A tool is some means that can be used to exploit a vulnerability in a computer or
network [HoL98]. A tool can be simple or sophisticated in its execution. A vulnerability
is some weakness in a system that allows an unintended event or unauthorized action to
occur. An attack is comprised of one or more vulnerabilities that are exploited by an
attacker using one or more tools.
An event is an action directed at a target which is intended to result in a change of
state, or status, of the target [HoL98]. Howard's action categories are found in Table 8.
In order for there to be an event, there must be an action that is taken against a target.
This brings the breakdown of an event into the separate items of an action and target. An
action is a step taken by a user or process in order to achieve a result. The action must be
directed against a target, but the action does not have to succeed in changing the state of
the target.
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Table 6. Howard's Tool Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Physical attack

A means of physically stealing or damaging a computer,
network, its components, or its supporting systems

Information
exchange

A means of obtaining information either from other attackers or
from the people being attacked

User command

A means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to
a process through direct user input at the process interface

Script or program

A means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to
a process through the execution of a file of commands (script)
or a program at the process interface

Autonomous agent

A means of exploiting a vulnerability by using a program, or
program fragment, which operates independently from the user

Toolkit

A software package which contains scripts, programs, or
autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities

Distributed tool

A tool that can be distributed to multiple hosts, which can then
be coordinated to anonymously perform an attack on the target
host simultaneously after some time delay

Data tap

A means of monitoring the electromagnetic radiation
emanating from a computer or network using an external
device

Table 7. Howard's Vulnerability Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Design
vulnerability
Implementation
vulnerability
Configuration
vulnerability

A vulnerability in the design of hardware or software whereby even
a perfect implementation will result in a vulnerability
A vulnerability resulting from an error made in the software or
hardware implementation of a satisfactory design
A vulnerability resulting from an error in the configuration of a
system
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Table 8. Howard's Action Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Probe
Scan

Access a target in order to determine its characteristics
Access a set of targets sequentially in order to identify which targets
have a specific characteristic
Flood
Access a target repeatedly in order to overload the target’s capacity
Authenticate Present an identity of someone to a process and, if required, verify that
identity, in order to access a target
Bypass
Avoid a process by using an alternative method to access a target
Spoof
Masquerade by assuming the appearance of a different entity in network
communications
Read
Obtain the content of data in a storage device, or other data medium
Copy
Reproduce a target leaving the original target unchanged
Steal
Take possession of a target without leaving a copy in the original
location
Modify
Change the content or characteristics of a target
Delete
Remove a target, or render it irretrievable

A target is some form of data found on a computer or a network system. An event
is the logical linkage between an action and a specific target of which an action is
directed [HoL98]. A list of target categories is found in Table 9.
The last part of an attack is the result, or more specifically the desired
unauthorized result. The possible unauthorized results for Howard's taxonomy are listed
in Table 10. An unauthorized result is the logical ending of a successful attack. This is
an important distinction in this taxonomy. If the result was authorized it could not be the
result of an attack.
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Table 9. Howard's Target Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Account

A domain of user access on a computer or network which is controlled
according to a record of information which contains the user’s account
name, password and use restrictions

Process

A program in execution, consisting of the executable program, the
program’s data and stack, its program counter, stack pointer and other
registers, and all other information needed to execute the program

Data

Representations of facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitable
for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by
automatic means

Component

One of the parts that make up a computer or network

Computer

A device that consists of one or more associated components, including
processing units and peripheral units, that is controlled by internally
stored programs, and that can perform substantial computations,
including numerous arithmetic operations, or logic operations, without
human intervention during execution

Network

An interconnected or interrelated group of host computers, switching
elements, and interconnecting branches

Internetwork

A network of networks

2.3.2.1. Objective

The objective is the purpose or end goal of an incident.

Table 11 depicts

Howard's attack taxonomy objective categories. The objective categorizes the efforts, or
results, of the attacker's actions.
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Table 10. Howard's Unauthorized Result Categories [HoL98].
Category

Description

Increased access

An unauthorized increase in the domain of access on a computer or
network

Disclosure of
information

Dissemination of information to anyone who is not authorized to
access that information

Corruption of
information

Unauthorized alteration of data on a computer or network

Denial of service

Intentional degradation or blocking of computer or network
resources

Theft of
resources

Unauthorized use of computer or network resources

Table 11. Howard's Objective Categories [HoL98].
Category
Challenge, status, thrill
Political gain
Financial gain
Damage

Description
No motivation outside of completing attack
Attack against a government target
Market advantage from actions on target
Unauthorized modification or destruction to target

2.3.3. Landwehr et al: A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws
In a paper which conducted a comprehensive survey of computer program
security flaw taxonomies, Landwehr et al. proposed a new security flaw taxonomy
[LBM93].

The paper describes a taxonomy as not simply a neutral structure for

categorizing specimens, but an organized theory of flaws to which we seek answers.
From this definition the paper broke down the study of computer attacks into three
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categories: flaws by genesis, time of introduction, and location [LBM93]. The taxonomy
asks these essential questions of each observed flaw, or attack:
•

How did it enter the system?

•

When did it enter the system?

•

Where in the system is it manifest?

2.3.3.1. Flaws By Genesis

The strategies used to avoid, detect or compensate for accidental flaws are
different than those introduced intentionally. Table 12 shows the how flaws by genesis
may be introduced intentionally or inadvertently [LBM93]. For example, increasing the
resources devoted to code reviews and testing may be effective in reducing the number of
accidental flaws. Intentional flaws can be categorized as malicious or non-malicious. A
malicious flaw is the purposeful advantage of a security flaw in a system. A nonmalicious flaw is the intentional introduction of a flaw. This is usually a system service
or other computer system function used by a program for non degradation use. An
example is a covert channel, which does not harm the host computer system.

An

inadvertent flaw in software is a flaw that remained undetected through the testing and
development phase. There should be no knowledge of this flaw until it is inadvertently
discovered.
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Table 12. Flaws by Genesis [LBM93].

Malicious
Intentional
Non-Malicious
Genesis
Inadvertent

Trojan Horse
Trapdoor
Logic/Time Bomb
Covert Channel
Other

Validation Error
Domain Error
Serialization/Aliasing
Identification/Authentication Inadequate
Boundary Condition Violation
Other Exploitable Logic Error

2.3.3.2. Flaws by Time of Introduction

In this Section the software development cycle is explained as a vector for flaws
as shown in Table 13. This cycle gives a time factor to how software is produced and an
understanding on when certain flaws may occur. The paper introduces three distinct
activities that fit the time taxonomy: during development, during maintenance, and
during operation. During the development phase, requirements are specified and a design
is constructed.

This is the groundwork for all future development of this piece of

software. If a flaw is not considered or discovered here, it will matriculate into the
software program.
During the development, the source code is developed. Without proper testing,
the human-crafted code could hold potential flaws. This is also true for the object code.
During the maintenance phase the introduced flaws are often attributed to a programmer's
failure to understand the system as whole. Flaws fixed during maintenance in this way
tend to introduce more flaws. During operation one should consider the introduction of
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unauthorized modifications during software use. Any change vector from a virus to
ordinary users may be able to modify the software and introduce flaws.
Table 13. Flaws by Time of Introduction [LBM93].

Time of
Introduction

Requirement/Specification/Design
Source Code
Object Code

During
Development
During Maintenance
During Operation

2.3.3.3. Flaws by Location

In this Section the concept of spatiality is introduced. This is a flaw which can be
classified according to where in the system it is introduced or found [LBM93]. Table 14
shows how the flaws by location are deconstructed. Most flaws occur in software, but
they can also occur in hardware as well. Software spatiality is divided into operating
system, support and application.

Operating systems are defined as a system which

handled memory and processor allocation, process management, device handling, file
management, and accounting [LBM93].
This layout is chosen by [LBM93] because it matches the typical layout of known
operating systems. The support program category is the other programs which interface
with the software including: compilers, editors, databases and other non operating system
programs. The application software is a category for programs that have no special
system privileges.
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Table 14. Flaws by Location [LBM93].
System Initialization
Operating
System
Location

Software

Support

Memory Management
Process Management/Scheduling
Device Management
File Management
Identification/Authentication
Other/Unknown
Privileged Utilities
Unprivileged Utilities

Application
Hardware

2.4.

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE)
According to AFPAM 14-118, IPOE is a rigorous analytical methodology focused

on providing predictive intelligence to warfighters at the right time for use in planning
and executing operations [DAF08]. The steps of the AF IPOE process are outlined in this
Section in detail and depicted graphically in Figure 5.

Figure 5. IPOE Cycle [DAF08].
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IPOE shifts the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) focus from a
reactive mode of "discovery" to one where the emphasis is to predict and confirm
adversary actions and inject decision-quality information where it can support the
commander's objectives [DAF08].

IPOE drives planning, is predictive, actionable,

understandable, timely, relevant and tailored. IPOE allows analysts, through observation
of adversary actions and behaviors over time, to develop an in-depth cultural, behavioral,
and situational understanding of the adversary. The basic steps in the IPOE process
remain the same, regardless of the level of military operations. The battlespace, or
operational, environment is the first area of focus for the process.
2.4.1. Step 1: Define the Operational Environment
The first step of the AF IPOE process focuses effort on defining areas and
characteristics of the operational environment that most influence campaign or mission
execution. This definition bounds the intelligence problem and highlights, for further
analysis, significant characteristics of the operating environment that may influence
available COAs or leaders decisions.

Defining the operational environment is

accomplished by following the below steps [DAF08].
(1) Analyze the mission
(2) Identify the amount of detail that is required and achievable within the time
available for IPOE
(3) Identify the limits of the operational area (OA)
(4) Determine the significant characteristics of the OA
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(5) Establish the limits of the area of interest (AOI)
(6) Determine the dimensions of the operational environment
(7) Identify intelligence gaps and priorities
(8) Collect the required material and intelligence necessary to complete the remainder
of the IPOE process
2.4.2. Step 2: Describe the Operational Environment Effects
The second step in the IPOE process determines how the operational environment
may affect both adversary and friendly operations. Predicting potential adversary COAs
and developing friendly COAs is an important part of the planning process [DAF08].
The operational environment helps or hinders both the adversary and friendly forces
when considering these COAs. The primary purpose of this step is determining how the
operational environment may affect, positively or negatively, both adversary and friendly
operations [DAF08]. This step is broken down into four steps outlined below.
(1) Analyze the physical environment
(2) Analyze the effects of weather
(3) Analyze the human dimension
(4) Describe and depict the effects of the physical environment, weather and the
human dimension on friendly and adversary operations
2.4.3. Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary
This step involves a detailed study of adversary forces in order to determine the
tactics, strengths and weaknesses of the adversary.

This evaluation is also used to

understand how the enemy typically will behave according to their employed doctrine
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and tactics. The products of this step may vary depending on the depth of the IPOE
analysis being performed, but generally will include identifying enemy centers of gravity
(COGs) and critical vulnerabilities (CVs) [DAF08]. The main purpose of this step is to
use the evaluation to predict potential COAs for step 4 of the IPOE process. This step is
broken down into four phases outlined below.
(1) Identify and analyze adversary COG/CV
(2) Create or update threat and other models
(3) Determine the current adversary situation
(4) Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities
2.4.4. Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action
The purpose of step 4 is to analyze potential adversary COAs and identify
develop, and prioritize likely adversary COAs to support friendly COA developments
that can be exploited to shape the operational environment and accomplish the friendly
mission [DAF08]. This step is broken down into six phases outlined below.
(1) Explicitly identify assumptions
(2) Identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end state
(3) Develop COAs based on adversary perception of friendly disposition
(4) Identify the full set of potential COAs available to the adversary
(5) Identify and nominate targets valuable to the adversary executing probable COAs
(6) Identify and nominate collection requirements that monitor potential COAs and
key operational environment characteristics
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2.5.

Attack Modeling
Attack modeling is a structured design geared towards understanding the

complexities of a security incident, such as a computer or network attack. This is the
method for portraying system states, vulnerabilities, exploits and attacker actions. These
models grant analysts the ability to digest the vast amount of details which comprise a
modern computer attack.
2.5.1. Attack Tree Modeling
Attack trees are diagrams which model the threat of an attack conducted by an
adversary against any type of target. The attack tree modeling concept for computer
security threats was developed by Bruce Schneier [Sch99]. His attack tree hierarchy
modeling provides a formal, methodical way of describing the security of systems, based
on varying attacks. This modeling system offers the ability to decompose, visualize and
determine the methods of an attack. Essentially, the attack tree enumerates the methods
an attacker uses to reach a goal or objective.
The root node of the modeled tree represents the goal of the attack. Each node in
the tree represents a set of sub-goals that must be achieved in order for the top level goal
to succeed [LHS03]. Traversing the tree from each leaf of the root node will reveal a
potential attack methodology used by the attacker to reach the goal. It is also important
to note that an attack tree, or its parts, can become part of a larger attack tree and as such
is reusable.
The four major components of an attack tree are: Root, AND, OR and Leaf. The
root node is the goal of the attacker, such as gaining unauthorized access to a target
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system. The AND nodes and OR nodes operate in a manner similar to AND/OR logic
gates. The AND node is only possible if all the children nodes are possible. Essentially
all sub-goals must be met in order to achieve the AND node. An OR node is possible if
one or more of the children nodes are possible to achieve.
Figure 6 is a simple attack tree of an attacker whose goal is to open a safe. The
Figure shows AND and OR nodes, with only AND nodes marked.

This example

demonstrates how each node becomes a sub-goal, and the children of that node are ways
to achieve that sub-goal [Sch99]. The example also includes values assigned to the
various leaf nodes, I (impossible) and P (possible). From these values calculations for the
security of the goal, or feasibility of attack, can be made. Any value, or metric, can be
assigned to the leaf nodes and then propagated up the tree structure in the same manner:
easy versus difficult, expensive versus inexpensive, intrusive versus nonintrusive, legal
versus illegal, special equipment required versus no special equipment [Sch99]. Any
metric that is placed on the tree graph can be used to show if an attack methodology is
feasible per the goal and the metric given.
Creation of an attack tree model requires expertise about the attack that is to be
modeled. The goal and all sub-goals need to be understood in order to make the model
worthwhile. The first step in creating an attack tree is to identify all possible attack goals.
Each goal forms a separate tree, although they might share sub trees and nodes. Next
identify all attacks against the goals, and add them to the respective tree. Repeat this step
until all attacks against these goals are listed. Note that sub-goals of a given goal can
form their own respective attack tree model.
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Building a complete attack tree gives the ability to analyze and research the
security decisions that have to be made for attack. The model will show the behaviors of
the attacker and how they will act. Therefore a security reaction, response and handling
plan for those decisions can be made. The model can be shown graphically or done in
simple text as Figure 7 shows.

Overall, the attack tree will give an analyst a

comprehensive look at the knowledge, methodology and tactics of an attacker through
their eyes.

Figure 6. Example Attack Tree of a Physical Safe [Sch99].

2.5.2. Attack Tree Metrics and Analysis
Creating an attack tree gives insight into all the possible attack methods an
attacker can use to reach their goal. A simple analysis is conducted by starting at each
leaf node and traversing up the tree to the root node. Each leaf node traversal will reveal
a potential attack methodology.

Moving past this simple analysis requires more
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information be included in the attack tree model. This additional information, or metrics,
added to a node is considered weighting the nodes. These metrics can be anything
quantifiable such as probability, success, cost, risk, or damage. Typically three or four
metrics are used [Ame04].

Too few indicators lead to a flat, one-dimensional

understanding of the forces that drive incidents. Too many metrics can confuse the
analysis. Ideally, indicators should be orthogonal. This means that the quantifiable
influence of one indicator is independent of another. Overall these metrics are considered
the capabilities of an attacker.
The metrics associated with a node are defined as capabilities.

Capability

analysis of a tree model consists of analyzing each of the nodes and determining the
value of the metrics to be assigned to the node. Through further analysis, this will
determine the likelihood of the attacks.

These resource metrics can be considered

behavioral indicators because they influence the behavior of adversaries [Ame05].
Capabilities-based analysis of attack trees is rooted on a very simple premise about
attackers’ behavior: if they want to and they have the capability to do so then they will
[Ame05]. In other words, if adversaries exist that have the motivation to harm the
system, the resources needed to carry out the exploits and a willingness to accept the
potential consequences of their actions, then, at some time, they will carry out an attack
on the system.
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Figure 7. Text Attack Tree Example [Sch99].

2.5.2.1. Attack Scenarios

An attack scenario is a particular path, or set of paths, through an attack tree that
leads from a minimal set of one or more leaf nodes to the root [Ame04]. An attack
scenario is the simple analysis as discussed in the previous Section. It is minimal in the
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sense that, if any of the leaf events are removed from the path, then the root cannot be
achieved. Attack scenarios can be found for an entire attack tree. The complete set of
attack scenarios for an attack tree shows all of the attacks that are available to an attacker
who possesses near infinite resources, capabilities and motivation. [Ame05].

2.5.2.2. Attack Tree pruning

An attack tree contains all possible methods to achieve the root goal. Analyzing
each of these attack scenarios of an attack tree for a given attack can lead to time
inefficiencies. These wasteful considerations are caused by analyzing attack paths which
are outside or not representative of the capabilities of the attacker.

An objective,

quantitative measurement of the scenarios must be applied to the attack tree in order to
alleviate this waste.

The determination of the least likely scenarios is the pruning

process.
Pruning determines whether or not a particular attack scenario in the tree model
should be considered for further analysis. This consideration is determined from an
analysis on each attack scenario as to whether a particular type of threat agent has the
resources required to reach the goal of the scenario [Ame04]. This act of pruning reduces
the attack analysis space. It should be noted that while pruning makes analysis easier, it
also can remove viable attack vectors and may potentially leave defenders unprepared.
2.5.3. Attack Tree Drawbacks
The attack tree is only a model, and as such it is only as good as the data it is built
from. Any data not included, wrongfully identified or incorrectly modeled can have an
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adverse effect on end results. Also, though a comprehensive attack tree is alluring, it is
not always the best choice. The complexity and upkeep of the data has the potential to
become overwhelming. The more thorough an attack tree, the more complex it becomes
which, limits its illustrative nature [Kar05]. There is a delicate balance of complexity and
usability that can hinder the models effectiveness.

2.6.

Related work
This Section covers related work in the cyber battle damage field of study. The

following research topics focus on damage and impact assessment.
2.6.1. The Horony Damage Assessment Model
In 1999, Captain Mark D. Horony developed an Information System (IS) incident
Damage Assessment Model (DAM) tailored to the needs of the IS manager's organization
[Hor99]. This model is shown graphically in Figure 8. The model was designed to be
part of a IS manager's toolkit to ensure a full and accurate damage assessment has been
accomplished for security incident response [Hor99]. The processes of a business are the
foundation for the DAM. The manager of an IS must define these processes and how
they relate to the information systems of their control.
Horony based the incident assessment process on eight primary factors listed
below. Each of these is further expanded into sub-factors which better define and explain
the primary factors [Hor99].
(1) Recovery
(2) Education/Training
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(3) Business Expenses
(4) Productivity
(5) Data
(6) Lost Revenue
(7) Reputation
(8) Human Life

Figure 8. Horony IS DAM [Hor99].

2.6.1.1. Recovery

Recovery is the process that a system administrator must take to restore an IS to
the most current state prior to an incident [Hor99]. The operations to support recovery
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include backups, manual data input, and repair of damaged software or hardware.
Recovery is a factor which includes all issues that must be accomplished to restore the IS
to the previous working state [Hor99]. The sub-factors for Recovery defined by Horony
are listed below.
(1) Investigation
(2) Restore
(3) Software /Hardware
(4) Consultants/Contractors
(5) Accounts

2.6.1.2. Education/Training

Education and training is a necessary factor when considering the various
business processes and information systems a user must understand [Hor99]. During the
course of an incident investigation the need for additional education and training within
the organization may become evident. System administrators and information security
personnel may not have the necessary skills to perform a thorough investigation [Hor99].
As new procedures and processes are implemented in an organization, so too does the
need to implement training and education of the systems. A goal of this training is to
reduce the overall chance of future incidents. The sub-factors of Education and Training
are listed below.
(1) System Administrator/Information Security Personnel
(2) Employee Computer and Information Security
44

2.6.1.3. Business Expenses

Business Expenses are the direct fees or costs that result from outages, which
affect customers and other businesses [Hor99]. An IS incident impacts the business
process of an organization, and as a result causes cost factors from IS outages. The two
sub-factors of Business Expenses are listed below.
(1) Customer Service
(2) Business to Business

2.6.1.4. Productivity

When an information systems' performance is degraded, the productivity of an
organization will be impacted [Hor99]. An organization's business processes must be
determined and understood in order to evaluate how the organizations productivity will
be impacted during and IS incident. Productivity has three sub-factors listed below.
(1) Mission Impact
(2) Downtime
(3) Communication

2.6.1.5. Data

Data lost as a result of an information incident must be evaluated for the ability
and cost of recovery [Hor99]. The impact of how an organization handles data, from
storage to usage, must be evaluated as a result from an IS incident. This impact must be
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understood in order to lessen the impact of future events. The sub-factors of Data are
listed below.
(1) Restoring
(2) Re-Entering
(3) Unrecoverable Data
(4) Proprietary Data

2.6.1.6. Lost Revenue

If a system is damaged it is necessary to evaluate how it will impact the revenue
generating process of the organization [Hor99]. There are two sub-factors to consider for
Lost Revenue listed below.
(1) Lost Sales
(2) Lost Customers

2.6.1.7. Reputation

Reputation is an overarching opinion of a company. This factor can be impacted
from an IS incident. This can in turn impact customers, employees, revenue and other
aspects of an organization [Hor99]. While difficult to quantify, the incident assessment
must include considerations for the reputation of the impacted organization. Reputation
has two sub-factors listed below.
(1) Consumer/Public Confidence
(2) Quality Employees
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2.6.1.8. Human Life

The consideration toward the human life factor in an organization is very
important. An IS may support life saving assets or missions. The morale and personal
life of information security personnel who respond to incidents must also be considered.
The basic fact to factor is that the quality and standards of human life depend on IS and
may be impacted by an organization's security incident. The sub-factors of human life
are listed below.
(1) Loss of Life
(2) High work load of Emergency Response Team members
2.6.2. Fortson Case Study of Damage Assessment
In 2007 Captain Larry W. Fortson established a conceptual operations-focused
methodological framework that facilitates effective defensive cyber damage and mission
impact assessment and reporting following cyber-based information incidents [For07].
The research focused on the relationship of damage assessment and mission impact. The
research used historical analysis and case study methodology for data collection through
literature review, examination of existing case study research and interviews with Air
Force members and civilian personnel employed as experts in cyber damage and mission
impact assessment of Air Force networks [For07].
The research found that damage assessment is conducted in a disjointed manner
and in many cases is limited to technical or economic reporting with no real assessment
of damage in terms of value loss [For07]. Damage assessment must consist of both a
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technical assessment and a damage assessment that measures a cyber value loss. The
prevailing theme throughout the research was the need to refocus the fixation on
technology to allow a more comprehensive understanding mission impact assessment
[For07].
Fortson states that damage from a successful cyber attack may be measured
effectively only if the value of the asset is known before the incident. Fortson's research
also found that Air Force organizations are not looking at the right assets for damage
assessment, due largely to a failure to recognize what assets support the mission [For07].
An organization must be able to identify the correct assets which support their mission.
They must also be able to articulate a value of the asset in order to provide substantial
damage assessment. It is through an organization's ability to identify and value an asset
before an incident occurs that cyber damage assessment is possible.
Fortson introduced the Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment
(CDA-D/MIA) as an improved methodology over existing mechanisms. The CDAD/MIA methodology is intended to assess damage and mission impact in the organization
where the incident occurred and provide rapid reporting of the assessment results to the
local decision maker, NETOPS command and control structure, and the appropriate
interested report consumers [For07].
In his framework, Fortson shows how an Incident Response Agent conducts a
technical damage assessment which is a separate report from the mission impact
assessment. This data flow of the technical damage assessment is depicted in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. CDA-D/MIA Incident and Impact Reporting [For07].

Based on these technical assessments the information owner can begin to
estimate damage by comparing the amount of critical information asset exposure to the
threat. The information owner and the incident response agent work together to determine
if the threat has resulted in any damage [For07].
Fortson's research showed that mission impact assessment is too focused on the
technical damage assessment and lacks a vehicle for comprehensive understanding of
mission impact due to digital asset degradation. Fortson does not design a methodology
for technical damage assessment, rather a framework for mission incident and impact
assessment. The purpose of network defense is to protect the information assets on the
network and Fortson's framework seeks to give the defenders the avenue to communicate
how those assets are impacted by a security incident.
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2.6.1.

Investigating Computer Attacks Using Attack Trees

In 2007 Poolsapassit and Ray introduce an attack-tree based filtering algorithm
that eliminates information from a log file that is not related to an attack being
investigated and extracts evidence corresponding to a particular source's role in the attack
[PoR07]. The research describes an automated attack-tree-based approach for filtering
irrelevant information from system log files and conducting systematic investigations of
computer attacks.
The research defines an "augmented attack tree," which extends the basic attack
tree by associating each branch of the tree with a sequence of malicious operations that
could have contributed to the attack [PoR07]. Figure 10 shows how an augmented attack
tree may be used to support a forensic investigation.

Figure 10. Log File Investigation Process [PoR07].
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To conduct a forensic investigation the augmented attack tree is first used to
generate the set of incidents corresponding to all the attack signatures for the system
[PoR07]. Each edge in the attack tree specifies an attack signature. Each attack signature
is a collection of several incidents. Then a log file filtering algorithm sequentially
executes queries to extract suspicious activities, from non-suspicious ones, from an
original log file from the attack. The algorithm starts at the root node of the attack tree.
It traverses every edge incident to the root node. For each step in the attack signature, the
algorithm searches the log file for matching operations. Then all the subtrees under the
node are explored recursively.

After all the subtrees under the root node or any

intermediate node have been explored, the algorithm marks an edge if it finds evidence
that shows that all the steps in the attack signature have been executed.
The next step in the process is to process the data produced by the log file filtering
algorithm for candidate sources of the attack [PoR07]. This is accomplished by sorting
the data by source to produce the list of candidate sources. The output of the sorting
process is the identity of the source being investigated. Therefore, the algorithm should
be used very carefully as it only provides evidence of activities that were possibly
involved in an attack. An investigator may use the identified suspected records with the
applied corresponding exploit labels to map the evidence back to exploits in the attack
tree.
This research shows how an attack tree can be used to filter and extract attack
evidence information from a large set of logged data on an attacked system.
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III. Methodology
This chapter presents the methodology used to create the CAMEL, the DCBDA
process and the steps used for the experimentation of this thesis. Section 3.1 covers an
overview to the methodology. Section 3.2 details the CAMEL and CAMAT creation
approach. Section 3.3 covers the DCBDA preparation phase approach. Section 3.4
discuses the DCBDA forensic analysis. Section 3.5 details the experimental design.
Section 3.6 summarizes the chapter.

3.1.

Methodology Overview
The primary goal of this research is to create an analytically rigorous, defensively

focused cyber battle damage assessment process which utilizes the detailed understanding
of the attack methodology. The ability to analyze an attack at any level of progress is
vital to a network's ability to survive and operate in a hostile environment. Knowing
from the studied nature of the sophisticated attacker that a cyber attack is likely to have
some degree of success, it is crucial for an organization to possess the ability to determine
if a cyber attack has occurred.
The cardinal focus of the proposed DCBDA process is to utilize the intelligent
comprehensive knowledge of the cyber attack methodology captured in the CAMEL and
organized in a CAMAT to identify cyber attack forensic markers for an active attack
incident. Before the DCBDA process can be used, the CAMEL and CAMAT must be
created. Once created, these products are continuously updated with new data by the
owning organization.
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The CAMEL contains the best known set of all collected data concerning the
actions in cyber attacks. An overview of the CAMEL creation process and CAMEL data
relationships are shown in Figure 11. The data in CAMEL includes attack actions, action
metrics, attack tools or methods, forensic evidence markers and forensic tools or methods
associated to the evidence. Possible sources for CAMEL data are forensic analysis white
papers, ethical hacker documentation, real world reports, and personal experiences. The
CAMAT is the attack tree model built from the comprehensive data in CAMEL. As
discussed in Chapter 2, an attack tree provides a detailed model in which to gain an
understanding of the attack methodology that may be used against a target system.

Figure 11. CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Process.

It is an important goal for this research to create the CAMAT model. The
CAMAT allows for detailed modeling of all key actions an attacker takes during an
attack. This in turn allows for attack COA study and understanding. The tailored
enumeration of attacker actions from the CAMAT pinpoints the exact files, settings, logs
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and possibly the bits that an attacker modifies during an attack.

By building an

exhaustive list of attack actions, their related effects and modeling those actions in an
attack tree, robust damage assessment of a cyber attack is possible.
Once the CAMEL and CAMAT exist, the DCBDA process can be utilized for
assessment. The DCBDA process in total is depicted in Figure 12. This figure shows the
two phases of the DCBDA process.

Figure 12. DCBDA Process.

The preparation phase begins with attack information derived from an attack
event. An example of this attack information could be the knowledge that a malicious
email attachment was opened. This information is then applied to the creation of the
Assessment Attack Tree (AAT) model, which is an event assessment specific attack tree
built from a subset of the CAMAT. The AAT is then analyzed and tailored to the attack
under assessment. This step creates the Tailored AAT (TAAT). The event TAAT is then
analyzed for likely attack scenarios, or COAs, which are ordered and listed in the Attack
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Scenario List (ASL). The ASL is then evaluated for evidence markers and associated
tools or methods to retrieve those markers. The evidence, tools or methods and the
actions to which they are associated are listed in the Evidence Marker List (EML). The
EML is the final product of the preparation phase of the DCBDA process.
The last phase of the DCBDA process is to conduct digital forensic analysis on
the target system utilizing the EML as a collection guide. The digital forensic process
varies by organization, but for the purposes of this research the steps outlined in Section
2.2.4, collection, examination, analysis and reporting will be used.
The forensic analysis starts with the evidence collection action on a target system.
The collection action uses the preparatory information, the list of software tools or
methods for evidence gathering, from the previous phase of the DCBDA process. These
tools, once executed, will harvest raw data for evidence analysis if found on the target.
This evidence analysis will determine if an attack occurred and the details
surrounding the attack such as damage and enemy COA identification. These findings
will answer the key questions of cyber attack. It is important that the potential damage be
validated as much as possible from the analysis of the forensic data. This detailed
analysis ensures the mission essential technical and operational impact reports, derived
from DCBDA assessment, are as accurate as possible.
The final action in the forensic analysis and the DCBDA process is a report. The
report lists, among other things, the collected data from the assessment. This data will
include the list of evidence found from collection and the associated attacker action
which caused the evidence to be generated. Potential attack vectors, system weaknesses,
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root causes and incident categories should also be included in this report. The report will
detail the findings of the analysis and finalize the DCBDA process.

3.2.

CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Approach
This Section covers the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT as overviewed in

Section 3.1 and Figure 10. The CAMEL is the comprehensive knowledge of all known
cyber attack methodologies comprised of attack actions, attack methods to produce the
actions, metrics of the attack actions, forensic evidence markers from the actions, and
forensic tools to retrieve the evidence markers. CAMAT is the attack tree model of the
collected data in the CAMEL. It should be noted that only one CAMEL and CAMAT
product is needed per organizational implementation. The steps for CAMEL creation as
covered in this Section are outlined in Appendix G and listed below.
1. Collect attack actions
2. Analyze attack actions for attack methods
3. Analyze attack actions and methods for forensic evidence
4. Analyze evidence for forensic tool(s) or method(s) for collection
5. Analyze metrics for attack actions
6. Model the CAMEL as CAMAT
3.2.1. CAMEL Attack Action Data Collection
In order to build the CAMEL, data concerning known attacker methodology must
be gathered, normalized and input into a list. The primary data point in the CAMEL is
the collection of attacker actions which comprise the entire cyber attack methodology.
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The attack action data in CAMEL should include all known COAs and TTPs for all
known cyber attacks. The sources for this data should be varied, accurate and as robust
as possible. Possible examples include: forensic analysis white papers, ethical hacker
documentation, real world reports, and personal experiences. Regardless of the source,
the overall goal of this aggregation is to detail every cyber attack in its entirety, as part of
the whole cyber attack methodology, as best as possible and with the most detail.
In order for the CAMAT model to be useful for an assessment, the data in which
it is modeled from must be complete and accurate. In order to build the CAMEL with
relevant useful data, the CAMEL Attack Action Data Form shown in Table 15 should be
used to standardize input collection. When collecting data for a given action, it is
important to consider the actions taken before or after the action being analyzed. These
actions may have an impact on the data being collected for a given action.

Table 15. CAMEL Attack Action Data Form.
Field

Description

Example

Attack Action

This is the identifier given to a specific
action

Heap Overflow

Parent Action(s)

These are the parent nodes of this action

Gain access to
web server

Child Actions(s)

These are the children nodes of this action

Malformed data

Attack Vector

This is the means which allowed the action
to exist

Configuration
error

Attack Results/Goal

This a description of the actions intended
results on the target

User Access
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The attack action form will ensure a standardized schema is followed for the
gathering of necessary information needed for the DCBDA process. Note that this form
should be modified to fit a particular organization's requirements for data aggregation.
3.2.2. CAMEL Attack Method Analysis
After the attack actions have been identified, the next set of data to input into the
CAMEL is the enumeration of the attack methods which produce the attack actions. This
data is collected from an analysis of each attack action in CAMEL. The analysis must
determine all possible methods which are able to produce the action. The method data
discovered from the analysis extends the information in CAMEL about an attack action.
Table 16 shows the attack method data collected in the CAMEL which should
include the name of the attack method, the attack action the method creates, a description
of what the method achieves and a source to retrieve the method for further research.
The attack method data allows for a detailed understanding of how the action is created.

Table 16. CAMEL Attack Method Data.
Field

Description

Example

Attack Method

This is a known set of the tools or
procedures that create this action

User input into web form

Attack Action

This is the attack action the method
creates

Command line access to
web server

Attack Method
Description

This is a description of the attack
method

Special characters in web
form not properly handled

Attack Method
Source

This is a source for the attack method

Forensic whitepaper
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When analyzing the scope of the attack action methods of a cyber attacker, the
analysis should not confine span and definition.

The fact of the matter is when

considering what methods a cyber attacker can use, there is practically no limit. Cohen
states that there is no fundamental distinction between information that can be used as
data, and information that can be used as program [Coh87]. Essentially data is code and
code is data. This consideration must be applied when creating input for the CAMEL.
3.2.3. CAMEL Evidence Analysis
This part of CAMEL creation conducts analysis on the attack methods and actions
to identify the forensic evidence markers which act as a digital fingerprint of the attack.
This effort requires a significant amount of research and analysis of the attack data. The
attack actions and methods must be thoroughly analyzed and every detail of its effects
recorded. The data collection from this analysis must enumerate every trace of evidence
on a system that can lead to the positive identification of the attack method or action
occurrence on a system.
A measure of confidence analysis must be applied to the identified evidence. The
data included in CAMEL from this analysis is shown in Table 17. Bearing in mind that
there are no universal processes or scientific underpinnings in the methods used to
recover or interpret digital information, a level of effort must be applied to give measure
to the certainty of the forensic analysis action [GiM02]. The confidence analysis can be a
qualitative value associated to the ability of the evidence marker to properly identify the
associated attack. This will allow a DCBDA analyst to measure the relative ability or
trust placed in the identified evidence for a given attack scenario.
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Table 17. CAMEL Evidence Data.
Field

Description

Example

Evidence Name

Name given to the evidence

Hidden file registry setting

Attack Action/Method

This is the attack action or
method the evidence identifies

Folder hidden option

Forensic Markers

These are the details of the
evidence

HKEY_CURRENT_USER
\Software\Microsoft\Wind
ows\CurrentVersion\Explo
rer\Advanced

Evidence Confidence
(Low, Med, High)

This is a metric given for the
confidence of the evidence
data

High

Evidence Source

This is a source for further
information regarding the
evidence

Mircosoft.com

3.2.4. CAMEL Forensic Tools and Method Analysis
The next step of CAMEL creation is to identify the forensic tool or method to
retrieve the identified forensic evidence markers. The specific data to be captured is
shown in Table 18. Each evidence marker is evaluated to associate a forensic tool or
method with the ability to harvest it from a system. These tools and methods must be
tested and have the proven ability to retrieve the markers they are correlated with. A
measure of confidence and a source must also be included for this analysis. These
identified tool and methods will be used in the DCBDA forensic analysis phase to
determine if an attack has occurred.
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Table 18. CAMEL Forensic Tools and Method Data.
Field

Description

Example

Forensic Marker

These are the details of the
evidence

A registry setting

Forensic Tools/Methods
for Collection

This is the tool or method to collect
the evidence

Regedit.exe

Tool/Method Confidence
(Low, Med, High)

This is a metric given to the tool or
method for a confidence value

High

Tool/Method Source

This is a source for further
information regarding the tool
/method

Microsoft.com

3.2.5. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Analysis
In order for the data in CAMEL to support detailed attack analysis, metrics must
be assigned to each action. These metrics allow the attack actions to be compared and
analyzed for a particular attack being studied. These metrics can take on any form
relevant to the organizational entity which uses the CAMEL such as risk, cost and
impact. For this thesis research two values will given to each attack action. These values
are risk of attack discovery and attack impact. An organization using CAMEL and
DCBDA operationally should consider a higher level of emphasis being placed on attack
metrics such using industry standard guidelines for metric creation and management
[NIS08].
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3.2.6. CAMAT Model
Once a best known complete set of data for the cyber attack methodology is
collected, an attack tree modeling the cyber attack data can be created. This model is
referred to as the CAMAT, as that it is the graphical representation of the cyber attack in
its entirety. The first step in attack tree creation is identifying the top level or root goal.
This step is the effect the attacker wishes to achieve. All other actions taken for this root
goal are considered subordinate and supporting to this goal. All of the data collected for
the given root node should be used in creation of the tree to ensure completeness to
model all aspects of the attack.
From the identified root goal, immediate children nodes should be determined. A
child node is an action which creates or supports its parent node. The relationship
between the child nodes does not have to be binary to ensure completeness, but the union
of the child nodes must cover every possible type of attack for the vulnerability listed in
the parent node [Edg07]. This process of identification of new children nodes is now
completed for the previously identified children of the root goal.

This process is

continued for all nodes listed until the complete set of aggregated data has been added to
the tree with the appropriate parent child relationship maintained and modeled. Each
node must also be modeled as either a AND, OR or leaf node designation as discussed in
Section 2.5.1. Each node must also allow for a reference to the verbose data in CAMEL
which it was built from. Below is a pseudo code algorithm which shows how to build an
attack tree.
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Algorithm 1 Attack Tree Model Creation Algorithm
Root Node: The attack goal
Parent Node: A goal which has supporting goals required for fulfillment
Child Node: A goal which is subordinate and creates or supports its parent goal
Build root node
Set root node as parent
While a parent has a child
Build children node(s) of parent
If a child is a parent
Set child as a parent
End While

3.2.7. Assumptions
This effort assumes that the evidence evaluation process results in meaningful
data output which leads to the identification of a marker for collection. An assumption
for tool selection must also be noted here. The manner in which what tools are available
for use during collection is outside the scope of this research. Ideally metrics should be
established that help determine the extent that a software or hardware tool performs a
particular forensic function, and the associated error rate with that process [GiM02].
From this tool analysis and selection process a refined tool repository would be available
for the evidence collection tool selection for the DCBDA process.

3.3.

DCBDA Preparation Phase Approach
This approach covers the steps necessary to complete the DCBDA preparatory

actions as shown in Figure 13. The preparatory actions of the battle damage assessment
process are vital to understand the technical impact of a cyber attack. The purpose of the
preparation phase is to utilize the intelligent comprehensive knowledge captured in
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CAMEL and modeled in CAMAT to determine the forensic evidence and collection
methods for the forensic analysis. There are four steps of the DCBDA preparation phase:
1. AAT Creation
2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation
3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation
4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation

Figure 13. DCBDA Preparation Phase.
The first step in the process is to create the attack tree for the attack event under
assessment. This tree is the AAT, which is created from a subset of the CAMAT. This
step starts by gathering the relevant information concerning the attack being analyzed.
This information must include the specific attack actions which are deemed the purposes
of the cyber attack.

Once the attack actions are known, the CAMEL/CAMAT

information can be used to create the AAT for the attack being assessed.

64

The second step analyzes the AAT and tailors the model to the attack being
assessed. This is the capability analysis which is completed to prune and prioritize the
possible actions of the attack under assessment. This step creates the TAAT.
The third step selects and orders likely attack scenarios from the TAAT. Attack
scenarios are the collective set of possible COAs followed during the attack. Once these
attack scenarios have been listed in an ASL, the evidence of the attack can be identified.
The final step of the preparation phase focuses on evidence evaluation based on
the information in the ASL. Knowing the enemy's detailed cyber attack COAs enables
the identification of important evidence markers from the CAMEL to evaluate if a cyber
attack, or in other words an executed adversary COA, took place on a target system. The
identified markers must then be evaluated to associate the trusted forensic software
programs or methods listed in CAMEL that can retrieve the evidence markers from
assessment target.

The evidence marker, the action it identifies and the forensic

collection method(s) comprise the Evidence Marker List (EML) product of this last step
in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process.
3.3.1. AAT Creation
The first step in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process is to create the
AAT. The steps of this process are shown graphically in Figure 14 and are:
1. Determine the root goal of the attack
2. Search CAMEL/CAMAT for the root goal
3. Transfer data of root goal and all subordinate children actions from
CAMEL/CAMAT to create the AAT
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Figure 14. DCBDA AAT Creation.
The first step of AAT creation is to determine the root goal of the attack from the
gathered relevant information concerning the attack event being analyzed and assessed.
This information must include the specific attack action which is deemed the purpose of
the cyber attack. This is the root goal for the assessment. Once the root attack action is
known, the information in the CAMEL/CAMAT can be used to create the AAT.
The next step searches the CAMEL/CAMAT for the root goal identified in the
previous step. If the goal is not specifically found, the assessment must decide the most
reasonable parent goal that is of the same category of the attack. An example of this
would be an unknown method for gaining access to a computer. The root goal for this
example would be gaining access.
The final step of AAT creation creates the AAT from the data in the
CAMEL/CAMAT. When the root goal is found in CAMEL/CAMAT the data is copied
and transferred starting with the root goal, to include all children and their associated
children. This data retains the parent child relationships, thus remains an attack tree.
This data is now the AAT and can be used for attack analysis.
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3.3.2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation
Once the AAT has been created, it is time to apply a level of analysis on the
segment of data which has been aggregated and modeled for the DCBDA. This analysis
process is depicted in Figure 15. While the goal of the CAMEL is to be as complete as
possible, the end goal for the AAT analysis is to prune the total set of attacker COAs to a
manageable, applicable and believable set. This will be captured in the TAAT. It is an
intuitive approach to this analysis that realizes an attacker is much less likely to try every
single attack method, rather than just a few of the most probable or applicable. The two
parts to this step of the preparation phase of DCBDA are:
1. Capability Determination
2. Capability Analysis
The first step in AAT analysis is to apply capability determination to the attack
actions represented by the values of the associated metrics.

This analysis uses the

collected attack event information to update and/or apply new metrics to the attack
actions in the AAT. Essentially this step creates an assessment AAT which contains
updated data to reflect the particular attack being assessed. The same level of rigor used
to create the metrics for CAMEL should be applied here. For the purposes of this thesis,
the metrics will not be updated or modified.

Once the capability determination is

complete, capability analysis can be accomplished.
Capability analysis, the second part of this step, determines which actions should
not be considered for inclusion in the DCBDA TAAT. This analysis uses the attack
action metrics to determine if an attack action should be removed from the AAT and the
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attack assessment. This determination can be decided from a known attacker capability,
attack event data or an arbitrary decision by the DCBDA analyst. This analysis process is
known as pruning, as the resulting attack tree will be smaller than the original. It should
be noted that the pruning process can remove plausible potential attack vectors from the
attack tree. The product of this step will be a TAAT which is an attack tree with the
realizable set of attack scenarios for the given attack event being assessed.

Figure 15. DCBDA AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation.

3.3.3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation
This step of the preparatory actions for DCBDA is COA analysis and ASL
creation. This step is outlined in Figure 16. Recall from Section 2.5.2.1 that an attack
scenario is a particular path through an attack tree that leads from a minimal set of one or
more leaf nodes to the root. At this point the TAAT will have numerous possible attacks
to achieve the root goal. In order to maximize the efficiency and accuracy of the damage
assessment, attack scenarios should be identified, listed and ordered according from the
most to the least likely. This list is referred to as the ASL. This intelligence product
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provides a decision maker with a threat assessment based on an analysis of the full range
of adversary capabilities and a prediction of the adversary’s likely intention [DOD07].
The ASL is based on the given collected attack data which has been modeled into
information, analyzed by capability and coalesced into a tailored attack tree model.

Figure 16. DCBDA Attack Scenario Analysis and ASL Creation.

The priority of attack scenarios can be decided from the combined results of the
TAAT capability analysis or an arbitrary determination from the DCBDA analyst.
Depending on the size of the attack tree being analyzed it is very useful for time
considerations of an assessment to develop a prioritized list of attack scenarios. This
allows the DCBDA forensic analysis to place the analysis of probable attack scenarios
ahead of unlikely attack scenarios. This ordering will also enable a threshold decision to
be made when considering what forensic evidence collection tools to use on the target
system. An example format for this listing is shown in Table 19. The ASL is the product
of this stage of the DCBDA process.
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Table 19. DCBDA ASL.
Attack Scenario Data
Scenario Name
Attack Action Listing

3.3.4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation
The final step in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process is evidence
evaluation and EML creation. The actions of this step are outlined in Figure 17. The
goal of evidence evaluation is to use the listed attack scenarios in the ASL to identify the
forensic evidence markers and the forensic tools necessary to determine if the actions
took place on a system. This process takes the relevant data in the CAMEL and transfers
it into the EML.

Figure 17. DCBDA Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation.
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The EML is the specific evidence and tools needed to identify the attack being
assessed.

The evaluation of the evidence should take into account the operating

environment of the analysis in determining the appropriate tools to identify. The EML is
the product of the evidence evaluation and is the final product of the preparation phase of
the DCBDA process. The EML is next used for the forensic analysis process.
Table 20 holds the format which is used as a record in the EML product. In total
the EML is comprised of a record, or entry, for each action in the attack scenario which
has information regarding the name of the action, the evidence identifiers which identify
the action, and the associated tool which retrieves the identifiers.

Table 20. DCBDA EML Data.
Field

Description

Example

Evidence Name

This is the name given to
the evidence

Hidden file registry setting

Name of Action

This is the identifier given
to a specific action

Heap Overflow

Forensic Marker

These are the details of the
evidence

A registry setting

Forensic Tools/Method

This is the tool or method
to collect the evidence

Regedit.exe
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3.3.5. Assumptions
The exact makeup of the AAT will change depending on many factors. The
target system can have a large impact on the makeup of the attack tree. A particular OS
may have a very different attack vector than an OS version with only a service pack in
difference. For the purposes of this research, the focus will remain on one target system.
This will allow the data in the DCBDA process to be demonstrated, and therefore have
the ability to be expanded or created new for different targets.

3.4.

DCBDA Forensic Analysis Approach
This phase of the DCBDA research effort is the collection, analysis and reporting

for the forensic analysis. A graphical representation of this phase is shown in Figure 18.
This phase acts on the culmination of data aggregation, modeling, evaluation and analysis
of the DCBDA preparation phase. This step also takes the DBCDA process from the
intelligence preparation process into active defense assessment. The goal of DCBDA
forensic analysis is the recovering, analyzing and presenting of evidence of a potential
attack on a target system. This research will follow the analysis guidelines found in
Section 2.2.4 which is further detailed in the National Institute of Standards and
Technology: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response [NIS06].

Figure 18. DCBDA Forensic Analysis.
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3.4.1. Evidence Collection
This step of the DCBDA is the execution of the tools identified in the EML. The
listed tools, or forensic COAs, will collect the evidence needed for the attack analysis. It
is important that a standardized process be followed when running these tools. The exact
process of collection will vary according to organizational procedures, tools, environment
and many other factors. There are many examples of guidelines which may be used for
the collection of evidence during a forensic analysis [DOJ04] [NIS06].
3.4.2. Evidence Analysis
With the identified evidence for the attack collected, it is time to begin analysis of
the attack. This process is the investigation into the meaning of what evidence was found
on the target system. Recall from Section 2.2.4.3 that the objective of analysis is to
derive useful information which forms conclusions to the questions that were the impetus
for performing the collection and examination [NIS06]. There are several methods of
analysis that may be conducted depending on the type of attack and the data collected.
Some examples of analysis that may be performed include timeframe, data hiding,
application and file, and ownership and possession [DoJ04].
The collected data must be processed into usable information.

This process

examines the set of data collected from the target system and locates the evidence within.
Essentially the examination gleans the pertinent useful data from the total set of
information harvested from the forensic tools. This data is then analyzed to determine if
an attack occurred and the details surrounding the attack such as damage, cause and
enemy COA identification.
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The analysis of the data should break down the findings from collection and
deduce their meaning. The analysis should compare the collected evidence information
to the EML to determine if the attack actions identified in the DCBDA preparation phase
occurred.
3.4.3. Reporting
The report is the final product of the DCBDA process, and is the detailed
chronicle of the damage assessment based on the evidence analysis. The purpose of this
report is to document the determination if an attack, or weapon system, was used against
the target. An analyst or examiner has the responsibility for completely and accurately
reporting the findings and results of an analysis of the digital evidence examination
[DoJ04]. This step relies on the presence of proper documentation at each step of the
DCBDA process.

Notes, copies, times, documents and any pertinent additional

information must be kept throughout the assessment.
The report lists the collected data from the assessment. This data will include the
list of evidence found from collection and the associated attacker action which caused the
evidence to be generated. Potential attack vectors, system weaknesses, root causes and
incident categories should also be included in this report. The report will detail the
findings of the analysis and finalize the DCBDA process.
3.4.4. Assumptions
This research does not address a specific organizations forensic analysis
capabilities or ability to comprehend, act or report on the data collected from the DCBDA
process. The actions in this methodology are used as research and meant to be tailored to
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an operational level. For the purposes of this research it is assumed that the tools used
and run during collection are done so in a forensically-sound manner.

3.5.

Experimental Method to Verify the DCBDA Process
The objective of the experiment outlined in this Section is to verify the DCBDA

process by conducting assessments as outlined in the methodology in Sections 3.3 and
3.4.

The experiment will create a CAMEL/CAMAT, and then conduct different

DCBDAs on target test systems. The EML created during the preparation phases will
then be compared to the gathered evidence to determine the success of the DCBDA. The
test systems for use in this experiment will represent computer systems which are the
victims of successful cyber attacks. Appendix H details the steps taken to setup the test
systems. The experiment is divided into three tests each designed to test an attack
scenario produced from the DCBDA preparation phase.
3.5.1. Experiment Scope
The attack used for this experimentation will focus on the Covering Tracks attack
action of the cyber attacker methodology [SkL05]. This decision places a margin on the
experiment, as that any attack tactic, technique, procedure and target could be used as a
basis for an attack tree model and subsequent steps of the DCBDA process. Focusing on
one attack allows for a threshold to be placed on the amount of data included for a viable
proof of concept of the modeled attack tree, the forensic marker enumeration, analysis
and subsequent actions in other areas in this research.
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The target OS used for this attack is Windows XP. The attacker capabilities do
not include any attack action or method which is evaluated to be of high risk of
discovery. Also, any action which is outside the scope of the target OS is not be
considered.
3.5.2. System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the DCBDA process. Figure 19 shows the SUT.
It consists of the AAT (TAAT), the ASL, the EML and Forensic Analysis components.
The Component Under Test (CUT) is the data contained in the EML of the DCBDA.
The CUT is designed and optimized for each test to compare system output to the
workload parameter.

The workload parameter of the system is an attack scenario

environment, such as a victim computer system. The system parameters are the CAMEL
and CAMAT. The system response metric is the gathered evidence, in a DCBDA report,
which documents the damage and evidence of the cyber attack event.

Figure 19. DCBDA SUT Diagram.
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3.5.3. Experimental Design
The objective of the experiment is to determine if the DCBDA process is able to
conduct a conclusive cyber attack damage assessment. This is done by comparing the
EML of the test to the evidence gathered from conducting a DCBDA on the test victim
computer.
The first step of the experiment is to create a CAMEL and CAMAT from the
methodology steps outlined in Section 3.2. These products are used for all of the tests
without modification.
The next step of the experiment is to conduct the preparation phase of the
DCBDA process as outline in Section 3.3. This step of the experiment will use the
CAMEL and CAMAT created in the previous step and the attack scenarios outlined in
Table 21 as attack event input. This step of the experiment must create an ASL for each
of the three attack scenarios. These three ASLs will be used to produce three respective
EMLs, one for each forensic analysis experiment tests.

Table 21. Experiment Test Scenarios.
Attack
Scenario
1

Initial Analysis Attack
Action
Covering Tracks
maneuver has occurred

2

Covering Tracks
maneuver has occurred

3

Covering Tracks
maneuver has occurred

Damage suspected
A suspected ICMP covert channel is disguised
by a rootkit. Possible log manipulation
suspected as well.
Possible auditing manipulation. Alternate data
stream possible to cover attack executables.
Files denoting recent activity may have been
cleaned off of system as well.
Suspicious files on the target system
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The final step of the experiment is to conduct the forensic analysis phase of the
DCBDA process. The inputs for this part of the experiment are the three EMLs created
in the previous step. These experiment tests will produce reports which will be compared
to the EMLs to determine the results of the experiment as a whole. The forensic analysis
experiment tests for this step are described below.

3.5.3.1.

Test 1

This test uses the system Test_1 described in Table 22. The DCBDA input is
attack scenario 1 in Table 21. The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as
outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 1 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase
following the previous step of the experiment.

Table 22. Experiment Test_1 System.
VM Name
VM Configuration
Guest OS
Specific Attacker
Actions/Files

3.5.3.2.

Test_1
2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM,
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter
Windows XP Service Pack 3
(1) WinPCap 4.1.2 installed.
(2) ptunnel.exe used to create an ICMP tunnel to a receiving
proxy previously setup.
(3) The FU rootkit used to hide the ptunnel.exe process.
(4) Evidence Eliminator used to clear the event logs of any
trace of these actions.

Test 2

This test uses the system Test_2 described in Table 23. The DCBDA input is
attack scenario 2 in Table 21. The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as
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outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 2 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase
following the previous step of the experiment.

Table 23. Experiment Test_2 System.
VM Name
VM Configuration
Guest OS
Specific Attacker
Actions/Files

3.5.3.3.

Test_2
2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM,
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter
Windows XP Service Pack 3
(1) Disable EventLogs service in Administrator tool: Services.
(2) Two Alternate Data Streams (ADS) created using the type
cmd to hide notional attack executable bad.exe in calc.exe.
(3) Two txt files created, deleted and 'emptied' from Recycle
Bin.
(4) ZeroTracks used to remove browsing and recent file
history.

Test 3

This test uses the system Test_3 described in Table 24. The DCBDA input is
attack scenario 3 in Table 21. The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as
outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 3 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase
following the previous step of the experiment

Table 24. Experiment Test_3 System.
VM Name
VM Configuration
Guest OS
Specific Attacker
Actions/Files

Test_3
2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM,
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter
Windows XP Service Pack 3
(1) Create secrets.txt file.
(2) Use steghide-0.5.1-win32 to hide secrets.txt into
winter.jpg.
(3) Use timestomp.exe to modify time value of winter.jpg to
Monday 1/1/2001 01:01:01 AM.
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3.5.4. Test Systems Specifications
Each test machine, which is a clean system before attacker actions, is a virtual
machine instance of Windows XP, Service Pack 3, running on top of a 64-bit Microsoft
Windows 7 Enterprise host operating system. VMWare Workstation 7.1.8 build 324285
provides the virtualization support.
Using virtual test systems as defined in Tables 22, 23 and 24 allows the attack
actions to run on the clean system, and then the system state can be reverted for the next
attack test. This also provides the capability to create an image of the machine's state at
any time during the tests. This allows for restoration of the machine's state the clean
baseline or test state for evidence collections.

3.6.

Methodology Summary
In this chapter the methodology to complete the research is outlined.

The

approach to create the CAMEL is discussed to include how to gather and model
information for the CAMAT. The DCBDA process is outlined. The basic steps to
analyze the attack data and the selection of attack scenarios are discussed. The evidence
evaluation process of DCBDA is covered to include the Evidence Marker List. The
basics of the forensic collection, analysis and reporting are also outlined. The Section
concluded by covering the experimental design.
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IV. Experimentation and Results
The purpose of this chapter is to document the experimentation and results from
applying and testing the DCBDA process as documented in Chapter 3. The focus of this
chapter is to create a CAMEL and CAMAT, perform the DCBDA preparation phase
actions, and conduct the DCBDA forensic analysis tests.

The conducted DCBDA

forensic analysis will use the EMLs from the preparation phase to actively conduct
assessment experiments on target test systems to determine the validity and success of the
DCBDA process. The emphasis, while conducting these actions, focuses on analyzing
the results and documenting relevant findings.
Section 4.1 covers the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT. Section 4.2 covers
the completion of the DCBDA preparation phase. Section 4.3 reports the conducting and
results of the forensic analysis experiments. Section 4.4 is an overall representation of
the experiment results. Section 4.5 presents a summary of the chapter.

4.1.

Create the CAMEL and CAMAT
The data in the CAMEL is essential to the DCBDA process. For this experiment,

a CAMEL is constructed and used to prepare for the active collection during the forensic
analysis experimentation. The results from following the CAMEL and CAMAT creation
methodology for this experiment are outlined in the following Section.
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4.1.1. CAMEL Attack Action Data Collection
The objective to this step of building the CAMEL is to collect data regarding the
cyber attack methodology in its entirety. To gather information concerning this attack,
CAMEL Attack Action Data Forms are filled out and the data is coalesced into a
spreadsheet as shown in Appendix B. A variety of sources are used for the attack action
information gathering [Bos02] [DBM09] [MSK05] [SkL05].

The attack vector

information included uses Appendix A as the format for the data. A subset of the
gathered data is shown in Table 25.

Table 25. CAMEL Attack Action Data Subset.
Parent
Attack Action Action(s)
ICMP Covert Covert
Channel
Channel
HTTP Covert Covert
Channel
Channel
DNS Covert
Covert
Channel
Channel
TCP Covert
Covert
Tunnel
Channel

Child
Attack
Action(s) Vector Attack Results/Goal
None

4a,4b This action installs an ICMP covert channel

None

4a,4b This action installs a HTTP covert channel

None

4a,4b This action installs a DNS covert channel

None

4a,4b This action installs a TCP covert channel

A threshold is placed on the amount of data collected for the CAMEL used in this
experiment. The data gathered concerning the cyber attack methodology represents a
possible best effort comprehensive collection with the attention for greater detail placed
on the Covering Tracks attack actions. The data collected facilitates the needs for the
remaining steps of this experiment.
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4.1.2. CAMEL Attack Method Analysis
With the attack actions input into CAMEL, the actions are now analyzed to link
and associate appropriate attack methods capable of creating the actions.

For this

experiment, this data is discovered through a variety of sources which are included in the
spreadsheet located in Appendix C. This spreadsheet contains the results of the CAMEL
attack method analysis and extends the data listed in the previous step. The data is
considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis of the attack actions.
Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks attack actions. Table 26
shows a subset of the attack method data.

Table 26. CAMEL Attack Method Data Subset.
Attack Method
cmd: cp
AFX Windows
RootKit
Evidence Eliminator
Tracks Eraser Pro
Netcat
ZeroTracks

Attack Action

Attack Method Description

Source
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articl
Alternate Data Stream Command line type
es/Alternate_Data_Streams.html
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/a
Application Rootkit
System patch to hide information /aphex/Afx_win_rootkit2003.html
Erase temp files, histories, recent
Delete Attack Files
http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/
documents
Erase temp files, histories, recent
Delete Attack Files
http://www.acesoft.net/
documents
Backdoor remote access
http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1
Backdoor
program
39
Erase temp files, histories, recent
Delete browsing history documents
http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com/

4.1.3. CAMEL Evidence Analysis
The CAMEL evidence analysis process conducts an analysis on the attack
methods and actions to identify the forensic evidence markers which act as a digital
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fingerprint of the attack. For this experiment, this data is discovered through a variety of
sources which are included in the spreadsheet located in Appendix D. The evidence
confidence evaluation values are decided through consideration of the evidence source
and are based on a cursory analysis of the markers ability to identify the associated attack
method or action. The metrics used are low, medium or high confidence factor. Table 27
shows a subset of the data in Appendix D.

Table 27. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Subset.
Evidence
Name

Attack
Action/Method

Failed login
attempt

Brutus

Proxy attack WebScarab
suspicious
Netcat
open ports

Forensic
Tools

Forensic Marker
Failed login attempts
in log
PyFlag

Malformed data

Hidden folders Hide Folders 2009 Hidden folders

H

Wireshark H

suspicious open ports netstat

Suspicious Trojan
Trojan actitivy Beast
activity
System folder cmd: del
windows\prefetch
missing
windows\prefetch missing

Evidence
Confidence

H

Regedit.exe H
cmd

H

cmd

L

Evidence Source
http://www.webhostgear.com/
240.html
http://www.owasp.org/index.p
hp/Category:OWASP_WebS
carab_Project
http://technet.microsoft.com/e
n-us/library/bb490947.aspx
http://www.exterminateit.com/malpedia/removebeast#howfiles
None
http://www.fspro.net/hidefolders/

The spreadsheet in Appendix D contains the results of the CAMEL evidence
analysis. This product extends the CAMEL created in the previous steps. The data
values assigned for the evidence analysis portion of the experiment are considered to be a
representation of a possible best effort analysis of the attack methods. Particular effort is
placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks attack methods.
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4.1.4. CAMEL Forensic Tool and Method Analysis
This step of the CAMEL creation process identifies the forensic method or tool
which has the ability to retrieve the identified forensic evidence markers. Each unique
forensic marker is analyzed for a forensic retrieval method. These identified tools are
essential to the forensic analysis process and due consideration should be given to
analyzing the correct tool to retrieve the attack evidence.
The spreadsheet in Appendix E contains the results of the CAMEL tool and
method analysis for this experiment. This product further extends the CAMEL created in
the previous steps. The data values assigned for the tool and method analysis portion of
the experiment are considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis and
evaluation.

Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks evidence

markers. Table 28 shows a subset of the data captured for the method and tool analysis.

Table 28. CAMEL Forensic Tool and Method Data Subset.
Forensic Marker
Streams will examine the
files and directories for
streams
Searches drives & lists all
files that have ADS
System search for all active
ADS
list, view or delete
Alternate Data Streams
(ADS)

Forensic
Tool/Method

Tool
Confidence

Streams

M

ADSTools

M

ADS Scanner

M

ADS Spy

Tool/Method Source
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
http://www.soft32.com/download_20753
5.html
http://www.pointstone.com/products/AD
S-Scanner/
http://www.brothersoft.com/ads-spy74079.html
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445

M

Suspected Rootkit activity RootkitRevealer H
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4.1.5. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Analysis
This step of the CAMEL creation process analyzes the combined aggregation of
the data in the CAMEL to assign capability metrics to each attack action. These metrics
must be based off of all data associated to the action. This is namely the attack method,
evidence and tool/method for retrieval.
For this experiment two metrics are assigned to each attack action. Risk of attack
discovery is a low, medium or high value given to the action which is a value given for
the likelihood the attack action is discovered in a typical target computer system. The
values assigned are based on a computer system being passively monitored for
unauthorized activities by some means.

The second value is an impact of attack

measured as low, medium or high value given to the action which is a value of what
impact the action has on a target system. Each of the attack actions are analyzed and
assigned a value for these factors. Table 29 contains a subset of the data collected for this
analysis.

Table 29. CAMEL Capability Metrics Data Subset.

Attack Action
ICMP Covert Channel
HTTP Covert Channel
DNS Covert Channel
TCP Covert Tunnel

Parent Action(s)
Covert Channel
Covert Channel
Covert Channel
Covert Channel

Child
Action(s)
None
None
None
None

Risk of
Discovery
M
H
L
H

Impact
H
H
H
L

The spreadsheet in Appendix F contains the results of the CAMEL attack action metrics
analysis. This product extends the CAMEL created in the previous steps. The data
86

values assigned for the attack action metrics analysis portion of the experiment are
considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis and evaluation.
Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks metrics.
4.1.6. CAMAT Model
The experimental data collection and analysis for CAMEL is complete. Now the
data is modeled as an attack tree. The root goal used for CAMAT is Cyber Attack. The
tree building process outlined in Section 3.2.6 is followed to build the CAMAT. The
completed model is shown in Figure 20, with the majority of the Covering Tracks portion
of the attack tree not shown. That attack area will be covered in greater detail during the
DCBDA process of the experiment.

Figure 20. An Example of a CAMAT.
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4.1.7. CAMEL Findings and Results
The research and creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT following the
methodology outlined in Chapter 3 led to important findings. These findings can be used
to further refine this research, be considered for operational CAMEL usage, or help guide
future work efforts. The overall result is the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT for
use in the DCBDA experimentation.

4.1.7.1.

Attack Action Data

Overall, the information included in CAMEL must be tailored to fit an
organization's operational requirements for DCBDA. The adaptation of the CAMEL
process in this research must be thoroughly managed and documented starting with the
CAMEL Attack Action Data Form. This form is the basis for all other CAMEL data
collection and analysis. The data and format for this initial population of information
into the CAMEL must be given due consideration in an operational implementation to
ensure the success of dependent cyber battle damage assessments.

4.1.7.2.

Evidence Marker Analysis

During this research implementation of CAMEL it is important to ensure
evidence markers are as detailed and accurate as possible. These markers are the pivotal
data of the CAMEL. The forensic tool must be properly identified from the evidence
marker analysis and also have the ability to properly find the correct data to assess
damage from a cyber attack. This can only happen through the detailed analysis of attack
evidence markers.
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4.1.7.3.

Sensitive Data

The detailed collection and analysis of an adversaries attack methodology actions
should be considered sensitive information.

An operational implementation of the

CAMEL and CAMAT should consider this sensitivity of the data aggregation. This
product could also have the potential to be used against an organization if the attacker
gained knowledge of their understanding of the cyber attack.

4.2.

DCBDA Preparation
In this Section the preparatory phase actions of the DCBDA is completed. This is

done by collecting attack event information, building the AAT from the
CAMEL/CAMAT, identifying likely attack COAs through capability analysis, and
evaluating the relevant evidence to create the EML for forensic analysis consideration.
4.2.1. AAT Creation
The root goal attack being used for this experiment is the Covering Tracks phase
of the hacker methodology which seeks to obfuscate any actions taken during the rest of
the attack [SkL05]. This is the root goal for the AAT used for the DCBDA in this
experiment. To build the AAT the Covering Tracks attack action is found in the CAMEL
and the CAMAT.

All data concerning the Covering Tracks attack action and the

subordinate children are taken from the CAMAT and used to build the AAT.
The AAT of the Covering Tracks attack action is shown in Figure 21. The AAT
has 26 leaf nodes identified and 4 main children; log obfuscation, persistent access
obfuscation, attack data obfuscation and covert channel. Now that the AAT is created
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using the data in CAMAT and CAMEL, the attack methodology capability analysis of the
attack tree metrics is applied.
4.2.2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation
The key step of this action in the DCBDA process is to apply an analysis to the
data which has been retrieved from the CAMEL and modeled in the AAT. This is done
through capability determination and analysis. For this experiment, the metrics in the
AAT built from the CAMEL are not altered as part of the capability determination
process.
The capability analysis used for the TAAT follows the experimental scope of the
attacker capabilities. For this experiment, any action which had a high risk of discovery
is removed from the attack tree. Once the metric analysis is complete a pruning, or
removal or irrelevant actions, of the attack tree is accomplished.
The pruned AAT, now called the TAAT, is then modeled with only the nodes
deemed the focus of this DCBDA. The Covering Tracks TAAT model is shown in
Figure 22. The TAAT, along with the associated data for each action from CAMEL, will
be the input for the next part of the experiment, the DCBDA COA analysis.
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Figure 21. Covering Tracks AAT.
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Figure 22. Covering Tracks TAAT.

4.2.3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation
Using the knowledge of the attack from the AAT analysis, the goal of this step is
to understand and produce tailored attack COA intelligence, namely the listing of
prioritized attack scenarios tailored to the attack being assessed. This list is captured in
the ASL. The attack scenarios are created as a listing of attack actions an attacker would
use during an attack.
Table 30 shows the ASL which has the three attack scenarios created for this
experiment.

These attack scenarios represent three plausible situations for this
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experiment following the experimental scope. The shaded cells represent leaf nodes.
Attack Scenario 1 is a covert channel being the first step taken by the attacker. Attack
Scenario 2 focuses on auditing disablement as a priority. Finally, attack scenario 3
focuses on steganography use.

Table 30. DCBDA Experiment ASL.
Scenario 1
Covering Tracks
Covert Channel
ICMP Covert Channel
Persistent Access Obfuscation
Rootkit
Kernel Rootkit
Log Obfuscation
Erase Logs

Scenario 2
Covering Tracks
Log Obfuscation
Disable Auditing
Hide Attack Data
Alternate Data Stream
Delete Attack Files
Delete Prefetch
Delete Browsing History
Delete "Recent" History

Scenario 3
Covering Tracks
Hide Attack Data
Steganography
Hide Attack Data
Time Stamp Alteration

4.2.4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation
The goal of evidence evaluation in the DCBDA process is to use the listed attack
scenarios in the ASL to identify the forensic evidence markers and the forensic tools from
the CAMEL necessary to determine if the actions took place on a system. This data is
input into the EML which is the product of the evaluation and used by the DCBDA
forensic analysis to determine if the attack scenario occurred. The three EMLs created
from this data are shown in Tables 31, 32 and 33.
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Table 31. EML for ASL: Scenario 1.
Evidence Name
ptunnel
ICMP traffic volume
WinPCap for ptunnel

Attack Action/Method
Forensic Marker
ptunnel
ptunnel.exe on system
ICMP Covert Channel Suspicious ICMP traffic
ptunnel
WinPCap installed

Forensic Tool
cmd, search
Wireshark
cmd, search
RootkitRevealer,
Suspected Rootkit Activity FSecure Blacklight
Missing/incomplete logs
Event Viewer

Kernel Rootkit
Missing/Incomplete logs

Rootkit
ClearLogs

Table 32. EML for ASL Scenario 2.
Evidence Name
Missing/incomplete logs
Disable EventLog service
ADS detection
Files removed

Forensic Marker
Attack Action/Method
Disable Auditing
Missing/incomplete logs
Disable Auditing
Disable EventLog service
Alternate Data Stream System search for all active ADS
ZeroTracks
Files removed

Forensic Tool
Event Viewer
Services
ADS Scanner
File Scavenger

Table 33. EML for ASL Scenario 3.
Evidence Name
Attack Action/Method
Forensic Marker
Suspicious files/sizes
Steganography
Suspicious files/sizes
Suspicious files/sizes
Steganography
Suspicious files/sizes
Suspicious time stamp values Timestomp
Suspicious MACE values

Forensic Tool
Stegdetect
StegSpy
dir c:\ /A /S /T:W

4.2.5. DCBDA Preparation Findings and Results
The results of this stage of the experiment are the three EMLs which contain the
evidence markers and tools necessary to identify the attack under assessment in the
experiment tests. The results achieved from executing the cyber attack methodology in
Chapter 3 match the expectations of the thesis, which is the completion of the preparation
phase of the DCBDA.

The process relies heavily on the work completed for the

CAMEL. Notable findings during the conduct of the experiment are listed here.
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4.2.5.1.

Capability analysis is crucial to proper assessment

The metrics given to an attack node should be chosen and assigned with proper
consideration.

These metrics are the basis for tree pruning and subsequent attack

scenario selection. Improper values for these metrics can lead to incorrect pruning of
possible attack actions and therefore the damage assessment will be hindered.

4.2.5.2.

EML data

The data in the EML should be as relevant as needed for the organization
performing the forensic analysis. This EML format should be modified to include any
additional information needed from the DCBDA preparation phase.

4.3.

Experiment to Verify the DCBDA Process
This portion of the experiment conducts the DCBDA forensic analysis process on

the test systems described in Section 3.5.3 using the methodology outlined in Section 3.4
The goal of this portion of the experiment is to test the CUT, the three EMLs created in
Section 4.2.4, to the results of the these tests. The objective is to determine if a Covering
Tracks maneuver took place on the target test systems and to also deduce the specific
attacker actions discovered.
4.3.1. Test 1 Collection and Analysis
The tools identified in the EML for Scenario 1 in Table 31 are run on the system
Test_1 as described in Table 22. The results are listed below.
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The first method for action is searching for the ICMP covert channel program,
ptunnel. The resulting search found existence of files associated with the tool. The
results are shown in Figure 23. The existence of ptunnel in the \Prefetch folder indicates
that the program has been executed on Test_1.

Figure 23. Search Results for ptunnel on Test_1.

The second method in the EML is to use the tool Wireshark tool to identify
suspicious ICMP traffic. The tool is installed and used on Test_1. The results in Figure
24 show the tool is able to identify suspicious ICMP traffic. The ICMP traffic to an
unknown address indicates Test_1 is using a covert channel to communicate undetected.

Figure 24. Results for Wireshark Execution on Test_1.
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The third method identified in the EML is to search for WinPCap installed on the
target. The basic search found existence of files associated with the WinPCap program.
The results are shown in Figure 25. This is another indication that a covert channel
exists.

Figure 25. Search Results for WinPCap on Test_1.

The fourth method in the EML for test 1 is to use RootkitRevealer and F-Secure
Blacklight to search for a suspected Rootkit. F-Secure Blacklight found the ptunnel.exe
process which is hidden. The process identified by Blacklight is shown in Figure 26.
Figure 27 shows the results from running RootkitRevealer on the target system.
RootkitRevealer is able to identify two suspect registry keys. Overall the results for this
step in the EML are a success, due to Backlight's identification of the hidden covert
tunnel process.
The final method in the EML is to use Event Viewer to discover any missing or
incomplete logs. Figure 28 shows the success of finding the Security log empty. This
log being modified is a positive indication of Covering Tracks evidence.
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Figure 26. F-Secure BlackLight Results for Rootkit Detection on Test_1.

Figure 27. RootkitRevealer Results on Test_1.

Figure 28. Event Viewer Results on Test_1.
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4.3.2. Test 1 Report and Results
This Section is the forensic analysis report for the first test and is the final product
of this DCBDA process. The determination of the assessment is a successful cyber attack
is executed against the target. The ptunnel and FU Rootkit weapons were used in a
Covering Tracks maneuver.
Test 1 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a
tailored EML for the attack scenario. This EML is used to collect and analyze specific
evidence found on the target system. The evidence results, summarized in Table 34,
show the attack scenario of a successful ICMP covert channel hidden by a rootkit and
obfuscated by log manipulation. This resulted in the positive identification of all forensic
markers indicating a successful cyber attack action of Covering Tracks.

Table 34. Test 1 Results.
Forensic Marker From EML
ptunnel.exe on system
Suspicious ICMP traffic
WinPCap installed
Suspected Rootkit Activity
Missing/incomplete logs

Collection/Analysis Success
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

4.3.3. Test 2 Collection and Analysis
The tools identified in the EML in Table 32 are run on the system Test_2 as
described in Table 23. The results are listed in this Section.
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The first method for action is to use Event Viewer to identify any missing or
incomplete logs. Figure 29 shows the results of using Event Viewer to inspect the event
logs. The error is a clear indication of a log obfuscation attack action.

Figure 29. Event Viewer Results on Test_2.

The second method to use to collect evidence from Test 2 is the administrator
program Services. The EventLog service is inspected and Figure 30 shows the results.
The service being disabled is a indicator of a log obfuscation attack action.
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Figure 30. Services Results on Test_2.

The third method for collection actions is to use ADS Scanner to search for all
active ADS. The scanner is loaded and run on Test 2. The findings in Figure 31 depict
two active ADS on the system. This activity is suspicious and the name of bad.exe is an
indication of a cyber attack.

Figure 31. ADS Scanner Results on Test_2.
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The last forensic method and tool identified for action in the EML is to use File
Scavenger to identify removed files indicating an attacker presence. The tool is run on
the target system and the tool identified suspicious files and recently deleted files. These
actions, shown in Figure 32, show that Company Sales Plan.lnk and Company Secrets.lnk
shortcuts exist, but the files they are linked to do not exist. This is an indication of an
attacker attempting to delete these files as part of an attack file obfuscation action. Also
discovered, as shown in Figure 33, were three documents removed from the Recycle Bin.
These files were not able to be recovered, but the time stamps are very close to the
previously identified links. All of the identifiers found by the File Scavenger program
indicate a Covering Tracks cyber attack.

Figure 32. File Scavenger Suspicious File Links Found on Test_2.
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Figure 33. File Scavenger Suspicious Deleted Files Found on Test_2.

4.3.4. Test 2 Report and Results
This Section is the forensic analysis report for this second test and is the final
product of this DCBDA process. The determination of the assessment is a successful
cyber attack was executed against the target. The EventLog service is disabled, two ADS
files are discovered and suspicious documents are deleted from the system. These actions
acted as the weapons used in a Covering Tracks maneuver.
Test 2 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a
tailored EML for the attack scenario. This EML is used to collect and analyze specific
evidence found on the target system. The evidence results, summarized in Table 35,
show the attack scenario of an attacker covering attack action tracks by deleting files,
creating ADS to hide executables and the disablement of the Event Logs service. This
resulted in the positive identification of all forensic markers indicating a successful cyber
attack action of Covering Tracks.
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Table 35. Test 2 Results.
Forensic Marker From EML
Missing/incomplete logs
Disable EventLog service
System search for all active ADS
Files removed

Collection/Analysis Success
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

4.3.5. Test 3 Collection and Analysis
The tools identified in the EML in Table 33 are run on the system Test_3 as
described in Table 24. The results are listed in this Section.
The first method for action is to use the program StegDetect to find any
suspicious files for Steganography. The suspicious file Winter.jpg is identified on the
user's Desktop from a basic search looking for suspicious picture files. StegDetect is
used against the file with no success as shown in Figure 34. This is not an event of
concern, due to the EML having more than one method identified for Steganography
detection.

Figure 34. StegDetect Negative Results for Test 3.

The second method identified for use to collect evidence on Test 3 is StegSpy.
This program is used on the suspicious file Winter.jpg. As shown in Figure 35, this
identified forensic tool is not able to identify the file as having Steganography used to
cover an attacker's actions.
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Figure 35. StegSpy Negative Results for Test 3.

The final method to identify forensic evidence is to identify suspicious time
attributes associated to any file on the Test 3 system. The command "dir c:\ /A /S /T:W"
is run and each time value is analyzed. The result, as shown in Figure 36, depicts the
Winter.jpg file having a modified time value as the time is earlier than any other on the
system. This indicates an attacker having modified the values to cover an attack action.

Figure 36. File Time Attribute Analysis Results for Test 3.
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4.3.6. Test 3 Report and Results
This Section is the forensic analysis report for test number three and is the final
product of this DCBDA process. The determination of the assessment is a successful
cyber attack was executed against the target, with exception. The Winter.jpg is identified
as being a suspicious file with confirmed invalid time attributes. The exception lies in the
inability of the identified forensic steganalysis programs to identify a file being used to
hide data. The EML still identified a Covering Tracks attacker action, but the finding on
this test is the evidence analysis used for the EML must be accomplished again to
properly identify steganography files such as Winter.jpg.
Test 3 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a
tailored EML for the attack scenario. This EML is used to collect and analyze specific
evidence found on the target system. The evidence results, summarized in Table 36,
show the attack scenario of an attacker covering attack action tracks by modification of
suspicious file time attributes. More work is needed to determine the extent of the
forensic evidence of the cyber attack which occurred for this test.

Table 36. Test 3 Results.
Forensic Marker From EML
Suspicious files/sizes
Suspicious files/sizes
Suspicious file time values
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Collection/Analysis Success
No
No
Yes

4.4.

Overall Experiment Results
This Section offers an overall summary to the results of the experiment used for

this experiment.
4.4.1. Create the CAMEL and CAMAT Results: Success
The CAMEL and CAMAT are created for the cyber attack methodology and the
data is used for the experimentation of the DCBDA process. The notable findings are the
importance of attack action data, the importance of proper evidence marker analysis and
the sensitivity of conglomerated information concerning attack methodology.
4.4.2. DCBDA Preparation Results: Success
The preparation phase of the DCBDA process is conducted using the CAMEL
and CAMAT. The process created the ASL with three attack scenarios created for this
experiment. Three respective EMLs were created as well. The notable findings for this
part of the experimentation are the importance of capability analysis and data within the
EMLs.
4.4.3. Experimentation to Verify DCBDA Results: Success With Exception
The forensic analysis of three test systems is accomplished to complete the
DCBDA process and verify if the process has the ability to properly identify a cyber
attack. The experiments are a success with one exception of an inadequate EML to fully
identify all factors of the evidence of the cyber attack.
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4.4.4. Overall Experiment Results Summary
The results of this experimentation are summarized in Table 37.

Table 37. DCBDA Process Experimentation Results.
DCBDA EML
Test 1
Test 2
Test 3

4.5.

Forensic Evidence Match Result
Success
Success
Success (with exception)

Experimentation and Results Summary
In this chapter the experiment and results are discussed.

The scope of the

experiment is outlined. The creation of the CAMEL through attack action collection,
attack method analysis, evidence analysis, forensic tool and method analysis is covered.
The modeling of the CAMAT for this experiment is shown. The completion of the
DCBDA preparation phase to include attack tree creation is discussed.

Finally the

experimentation of the DCBDA process is conducted with three tests of the forensic
analysis phase.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the research effort and possible
considerations for future research.

Section 5.1 contains the research summary and

objective overview. Section 5.2 provides several recommendations for extending the
DCBDA research. Section 5.3 contains concluding remarks to include the contributions
of this research.

5.1.

Research Summary
The primary goal of this research is to provide robust defensive cyber battle

damage assessment capabilities through digital forensic analysis tailored by an
understanding of the attack methodology. The CAMEL is developed to facilitate this
comprehensive understanding of the cyber attack. The DCBDA process is outlined and
the process is verified through active forensic analysis experiments.

The following

Sections discuss each research objective to determine if they have been met from this
research effort.
5.1.1. Develop the CAMEL and CAMAT
The exhaustive listing of the cyber attack methodology allows for the intelligence
preparation of the operating environment to directly impact the capabilities of the
DCBDA process. CAMEL gives an organization a wealth of detailed attack information
to bolster their abilities to provide timely, accurate and detailed assessments of a cyber
attack. This research shows the proposed CAMEL process can be used to tailor the cyber
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damage assessment process when properly populated with accurate information. This
process can increase accuracy, timeliness and capabilities of future technical damage
assessments from cyber attacks.
5.1.2. Develop the DCBDA Process
The objective in defining the Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment process
is to develop a procedure which utilized a comprehensive wealth of information
regarding cyber attack mythologies. The research shows the proposed two phase process
allows tailored damage assessments to utilize the wealth of information in the CAMEL.
5.1.3. Verify the DCBDA Process
The purpose of this objective is to verify the proposed CAMEL and DCBDA
processes would correctly identify a cyber attack.

Through the execution of three

experimental tests the processes are proven effective and able to deliver tailored damage
assessment for a given cyber attack. The findings of these experiments should be used to
improve the research and be considered for any operational implementation of the
proposed procedures.

5.2.

Future Work
Utilizing attack methodology modeling for enhanced cyber BDA has many

avenues for further research.

The following Section discusses possible areas for

consideration to further develop this research topic.
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5.2.1. Real Time DCBDA
Through the course of this research it was discovered that extending the cyber
attack tree model to include more information would allow for a bottom-up identification
of an attack. Future work could explore the possibility of identifying and modeling
sensor alerts from a cyber attack through the CAMAT. Real time sensor alerts could then
be followed up the tree to the attack tool the sensor alerted on, and then to the attack
action(s) the tool is used for. From here, incident responders could use the detailed
knowledge modeled in the cyber attack tree to increase their ability to pinpoint an
ongoing attack. Figure 37 shows how the DCBDA process could potentially be extended
to allow for this future work. This figure shows how the sensor data and attack action
correlation can be found in the cyber attack tree.
5.2.2. Mission Impact Framework Incorporation
While it is understood that mission impact is not the same as damage assessment,
mission impact analysis is still very dependent on efforts like this research. Future work
could refine or further develop the DCBDA process to provide all the necessary
information for the best possible integration into a mission impact framework. Research
conducted by Captain Lisa S. Thiem showed in a case study of damage assessment on Air
Force networks that the focus on damage assessment was exclusively on technical
assessments and in some cases had no connection to higher level applications of the
damage assessment [Thi05]. The DCBDA process could also be incorporated into higher
level mission impact framework research [For07].
DCBDA process can work to alleviate this problem.
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Mission impact fusion into the

Figure 37. Real Time DCBDA.
5.2.3. Host-Based Security System Integration
Host-Based Security System (HBSS) is the Defense Information Systems
Agency's (DISA) security framework.

The ability to incorporate a battle damage

assessment function into the HBSS suite which could be administered from a remote
location would be extremely beneficial for incident response actions. Another system for
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possible DCBDA process integration is CyberCraft [KaP07]. This integration could lead
to a true attack awareness module benefiting from the DCBDA process outlined in this
research. This function could be implemented as a forensic agent.
Figure 38 depicts a plausible solution to this problem building on the proposed
real time DCBDA research.

Figure 38. Notional Automated DCBDA Diagram.

Sensor data from a detection system on the asset or the network the asset uses is
input into the cyber attack model. This sensor data is then matched in the DCBDA cyber
attack tree model to an evidence marker. This marker then identifies a forensic tool the
agent can use to retrieve the data from the target. The forensic agent then retrieves the
identified tool from a notional Forensic Tool Depot collection of tools and executes the
tool, forwarding the results for analysis. This proposed research would need to develop a
method to automate the tool selection from the attack data provided from a sensor. This
automation would entail attack scenario analysis and evidence evaluation covered in this
thesis research.
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5.2.4. Threat Agent Profiling Applied to Attack Tree Analysis
This future work effort would seek to expand the capabilities based analysis
conducted on the attack tree model. Intelligence on a threat agent profile could be
applied to the attack tree to further refine selected attack scenarios and evidence markers.
This future research area concerns the possible use of studied attack indicators and threat
agent profiles to generate pruned attack trees for tailored, efficient and effective forensic
analysis [Kle01]. This hacker profiling could also lead to the application of behavior
pattern analysis modeling. These behavior profiles may be applied to the attack tree
model, as part of the DCBDA process. This can be done by weighing the nodes in the
tree with values associated with the profile used. This future work would incorporate
threat profile studies, such as the insider threat, to prune the modeled attack tree
methodology for a tailored, targeted analysis.
5.2.5. Defense Tree Model
Defense tree modeling is closely linked to attack tree modeling. While attack tree
modeling focuses on the actions needed to complete an attack root goal, defense
modeling centers on the goal of mitigating an attack and the actions taken to support that
goal. The focus of this future research area would be to incorporate a defense tree model
into the DCBDA process. Related work in this area has shown that a close and beneficial
relationship can be shown between the two models [LHS03] [EkS09]. This defense
model could be used in conjunction with the attack model to form better evidence
markers and as a result work to bolster network defense efforts.

114

5.3.

Concluding Remarks
This research contributed a robust systematic process to capture and utilize the

comprehensive knowledge of cyber attack methodology for cyber battle damage
assessment. This work is unique from other research in that it focuses on bolstering the
capabilities of the technical damage assessment portion of an organization's ability to
determine impact of malicious cyber events.
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Appendix A. Attack Vector Categories
Table 38. Attack Vectors Categories [DOD09].
Attack Vector
Category Number

Description

Reconnaissance: Information was accessible and used to
Sub-category characterize DOD systems, applications, networks, and users
that may be useful in formulating an attack.
A

Information Gathering and Data Mining: Activity that seeks to
gather information from publicly available sources.

B

Network Scan: Activity that targets multiple IP addresses. This
is referred to as a horizontal scan.

C

System Scan: Activity that targets a single IP address across a
range of ports. This is referred to as a vertical scan.

Sub-category

Authorized User: A user with authorized access took specific
actions that resulted in jeopardizing DOD systems or data.

1

2

A

Purposeful: An authorized user knowingly took specific
actions that jeopardized DOD systems or data.

B

Accidental: An authorized user took actions that had
consequences over and above the intentions and jeopardized
DOD systems or data.

Sub-category

Social Engineering: Human interaction (social skills) or
deception used to gain access to resources or information.

A

E-mail: E-mail is the primary vehicle used to deliver a
malicious payload or gain access to resources or information.

B

Web site: A Web site is the primary vehicle used to deliver a
malicious payload or gain access to resources or information.

C

Other: A user was deceived or manipulated in a way that is not
covered by the other types of social engineering.

3
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Table 39. Attack Vectors Categories Continued [DOD09].
Configuration Management: Compromise resulting from the
Sub-category inadequate or improper configuration of an information
system.
A

Network: A system that provides network-based services was
improperly or inadequately configured.

B

Operating System: An operating system was improperly or
inadequately configured.

C

Application: An application was improperly or inadequately
configured.

4

5

Software Flaw: A vulnerability in the software that allows for
Sub-category the unauthorized use of or access to an information system in a
way that violates the system’s security policy.

A

Exploited New Vulnerability: This vulnerability was unknown
prior to the event or there was no mechanism available to
prevent it.

B

Exploited Known Vulnerability: This vulnerability was known
prior to the event and there was a mechanism available to
prevent it.

Sub-category

Transitive Trust: Compromise resulting from the implicit or
explicit trust relationship between security domains.

A

Other System Compromise: Compromise resulting from access
previously gained on another DOD system.

B

Masquerading: Compromise resulting from the unauthorized
use of a valid user’s credentials. This may include
cryptographic material, account credentials, or other
identification information.

6
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Table 40. Attack Vectors Categories Continued [DOD09].
Resource Exhaustion: The consumption of system resources
Sub-category that prevents legitimate users from accessing a resource,
service, or information.

A

Non-Distributed Network Activity: Activity from a single IP
address that overwhelms system or network resources. This is
generally associated with a DoS incident.

B

Distributed Network Activity: Activity from multiple IP
addresses that overwhelms system or network resources. This
is generally associated with a DoS incident.

7

Sub-category

Physical Access: The unauthorized physical access to
resources.

A

Mishandled or lost resource: Equipment was stolen, lost, or left
accessible to unauthorized parties.

B

Local access to system: An unauthorized user was provided
local physical access to a DOD information resource.

C

Abuse of resources: The physical destruction of an information
resource by an unauthorized party.

8

Sub-category Other
9
A

New Attack Vector: The attack vector is not covered by the
listed methods. Description of the attack vector must be
included in the incident comments.

Sub-category Unknown
10
A

Unable to determine: Attack vector could not be determined
with the information available.
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Appendix B. CAMEL Attack Action Data
Table 41. CAMEL Attack Action Data.
Attack Action

Pare nt
Action(s)

C hild
Action(s)

Scanning

Cyber
Ping, Whois
Attack
Reconnaissa
nce
Reconnaissa
nce
Port Scanning,
Cyber
Network
Attack
Mapping

Port Scanning

Scanning

Network Mapping

Scanning

Reconnaissance
Ping
Whois

Gain Access
Password Attack
Web Application
Attack
Maintain Access
Backdoor
T rojan

Covering T racks

Cyber
Attack

Attack
Ve ctor

9a
1a
1a

1a

1b
1b
Password
Attack, Web
Application
Attack

L

M

L

H

L

H

L

H

M

M

H

H

L

H

L

H

H

H

H

H
H

5

T his is the action an attacker
does to hide unauthorized actions
L
taken on a target system

H

T his is the targeted manipulation
of a system's logging capability to
L
obfuscate an attack

H

T his is the removal of attacker
files

H

3b

Covering
T racks

M

L

Gain Access
Cyber
Backdoor,
Attack
T rojan
Maintain
Access
Maintain
Access
Log
Obfuscation,
Attack Data
Obfuscation,
Persistent
Access
Obfuscation,
Cyber
Covert
Attack
Channel

Attack Data
Obfuscation

L

5b

2a

Log Obfuscation

T his is the initial information
gathering action of a cyber attack
T his action attempts to connect
to an asset on the target network
T his action enumerations domain
information
T his is the active information
gathering action for a cyber
attack
T his action determines open
ports of the assets on a target
network
T his action maps the assets of the
target network

Risk of
Discove r Impact

T his action seeks to gain access
to an asset
T his action attempts to use a
password for access
T his action gains access through a
web application
T his action seeks to maintain
access after intial entry is gained
T his action installs a backdoor for
later use by the attacker
T his action leaves embedded
attack programs running

2

Gain Access

Covering
T racks

Attack Re sults/Goal

5
5b

Fake Log
Entries, Erase
Logs, Disable
Auditing,
Overwrite Logs 4
Hide Attack
Data, Delete
4
Attack Files
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L

Table 42. CAMEL Attack Action Data Continued.
Attack Action

Parent
Action(s)

Persistent Access
Obfuscation

Covering
T racks

Covert Channel

Covering
T racks

Hide Attack Data

Attack File
Obfuscation

Alternate Data
Stream
Steganography
T ime Stamp
Alteration
Hide Files/Folders

Hide Attack
Data
Hide Attack
Data
Hide Attack
Data
Hide Attack
Data

Attack File
Delete Attack Files Obfuscation
Delete Attack
Delete Prefetch
Files
Delete Browsing
Delete Attack
History
Files
Delete Clipboard
Delete Attack
Data
Files
Delete Shell
Delete Attack
History
Files
Delete "Recent"
Delete Attack
History
Files
Log
Disable Auditing
Obfuscation

Add Log Entry

Log
Obfuscation
Log
Obfuscation
Fake Log
Entries
Fake Log
Entries

Erase Logs

Log
Obfuscation

Overwrite Logs
Fake Log Entries
Delete Log Entry

Child Action(s)

Attack
Vector

Rootkit
4
ICMP Covert Channel,
HT T P Covert Channel,
DNS Covert Channel,
T CP Covert Channel,
4a,4b
802.11 Covert T unnel
Steganography, Alternate
Data Stream, T ime
Stamp Alteration, Hide
4b
Files/Folders

4b
2a
2a
2a
Delete Prefetch, Delete
Browsing History, Delete
Clipboard Data, Delete
Shell History, Delete
2a
"Recent" History

Risk of
Discover Impact

T his is the removal of unauthorized
persitent access indicators

L

H

T his action installs a covert channel to
obfuscate remote calls to persistent
L
attack files

H

T his action hides attack data on the
system from discovery
T his action forks extended data onto a
file, this is used by an attacker to hide
attack data
T his action hides attack data in nonhidden files
T his action modifies the time attribute
values for a file
T his action modifies the hidden flag
for a file/folder

L

H

L

H

L

H

L

H

H

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

Remove data from the shell
Remove recent activity from the
system
Disable system auditing of actions
taken
T his action creates events that
overwrite events that the attacker
wishes to hide/erase
T his action creates false log entries to
obfuscate attack actions

L

L

M

M

M

H

L

H

L

H

T his action deletes attack log entries
T his action adds to the log entries to
hide attack data

L

H

L

H

H

L

T his action is the deletion of attack
tools
Remove attack data from the prefetch
data
Remove attack data from any browsing
history
Remove from the clipboard of any
attack data

2a
2a
2a
2a
2a
2a

2a
Delete Log Entry, Add
Log Entry

Attack Results/Goal

4b
4b

4b
Erase System Logs, Erase
Application Logs, Erase
4b
Security Logs

T his action erases logs on a target
system
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Table 43. CAMEL Attack Action Data Continued.
Attack
Vector

Attack Results/Goal

Risk of
Discover Impact

Erase System Logs Erase Logs
Erase Application
Erase Logs
Logs

4b

T his action erases system logs

H

L

4b

T his action erases application logs

H

L

Erase Security Logs Erase Logs
Persistent
Access
Obfuscation,
Hide Attack
Rootkit
Data

4b

T his action erases security logs

H

L

L

H

L

H

L

H

H

M

N/A

N/A

Attack Action

Parent
Action(s)

Child Action(s)

Kernel rootkit, User
rootkit, Firmware Rootkit,
Virtualized Rootkit,
5a
Application Rootkit

Kernel Rootkit

Rootkit

5a,5b

User Rootkit
Application
Rootkit

Rootkit

5a,5b

Rootkit

5a,5b

Virtualized Rootkit Rootkit

5a,5b

Firmware Rootkit
ICMP Covert
Channel
HT T P Covert
Channel
DNS Covert
Channel
T CP Covert
T unnel
802.11 Covert
T unnel

5a,5b

Rootkit
Covert
Channel
Covert
Channel
Covert
Channel
Covert
Channel
Covert
Channel

T his action installs a rootkit to hide
attack data
T his action installs a kernel level rootkit
to hide attack data
T his action installs a user level rootkit to
hide attack data
T his action installs a rootkit in an
application
T his action installs a rootkit in a virtual
hardware

L

4a,4b

T his action installs a rootkit in firmware L
T his action installs an ICMP covert
M
channel
T his action installs a HT T P covert
H
channel

4a,4b

T his action installs a DNS covert channel L

H

4a,4b

T his action installs a T CP covert channel H
T his action installs a wireless covert
N/A
channel

L

4a,4b

4a,4b
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H
H

N/A

Appendix C. CAMEL Attack Method Data
Table 44. CAMEL Attack Method Data.
Attack Method

cmd: cp

Attack Action
802.11 Covert
Tunnel
Alternate Data
Stream
Alternate Data
Stream

AFX Windows RootKit

Application Rootkit System patch to hide information

Evidence Eliminator

Delete Attack Files Erase temp files, histories, recent documents http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/

Tracks Eraser Pro
Netcat

Delete Attack Files
Backdoor
Delete browsing
history
Delete Prefetch

rcovert
cmd: type

ZeroTracks
cmd: del windows\prefetch
AuditPol
Disable EventLog service
Iodine
DNSCat
TCP-over-DNS
elsave
ClearLogs
Evidence Eliminator
WinZapper
Alureon
File hidden option

Disable Auditing
Disable Auditing
DNS Covert
Tunnel
DNS Covert
Tunnel
DNS Covert
Tunnel

Attack Method Description

Source

Covert channel using valid ACK frames

http://rfakeap.tuxfamily.org/
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Alternat
e_Data_Streams.html

Command line type
Command line type

[MSK05]
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/a/aphex/Af
x_win_rootkit2003.html

Erase temp files, histories, recent documents http://www.acesoft.net/
Backdoor remote access program
http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/139
Erase temp files, histories, recent documents
use shell to delete files
Windows NT Resource Kit for system
administrators
Disable EventLog service on startup

IPv4 data through a DNS server
bi-directional communication through DNS
servers
contains a special dns server and a special dns
client
ELSave is a tool to save and/or clear a NT
event log.
Erase logs
ClearLogs clears the event log (Security,
System or Application) that you specify
Erase Logs
Erase Logs
Erase logs
Fake Log Entries erase event records selectively
Firmware Rootkit Win 7 MBR modifications
Hidden option on
file
hidden' option is selected for the file
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http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com/
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/library/cc731451(WS.10).aspx
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/172156
http://code.kryo.se/iodine/
http://tadek.pietraszek.org/projects/DNScat/
http://analogbit.com/tcp-over-dns_howto
http://www.ibt.ku.dk/jesper/ELSave/
http://www.ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/clearlogs/
http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/
http://www.ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/winzapper/
http://www.virusbtn.com/pdf/conference_slides/2
010/Johnson-VB2010.pdf
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/help
andsupport/learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.mspx

Table 45. CAMEL Attack Method Data Continued.
Attack
Method

cmd: attrib +h
Hide Folders
2009
Folder hidden
option
Hopster

Attack Action

Hide Files/Folders
Hide folder

Attack Method Description

cmd: attrib +h
can make your files and folders inaccessible,
invisible or protect them from

httptunnel

Hide folder
hidden' option is selected for the folder
HTTP Covert Tunnel Client bypasses proxy servers
httptunnel creates a bidirectional virtual data
HTTP Covert Tunnel connection tunnelled in HTTP requests

ptunnel

Tunnel TCP connections to a remote host using
IMCP Covert Tunnel ICMP echo request/reply

Fu

Kernel Rootkit

Cheops-ng
Brutus

Network Mapping
Password Attack

ICMP Echo
requests
nmap

Ping
Port Scanning

Steghide

Steganography

DKOM to hide processes
Network management tool for mapping and
monitoring your network
Remote password cracker

Send ICMP echo request to target
Port scanning tool

hide data in various kinds of image- and audio-files
steganography in bitmaps, text files, HTML files
wbStego4open Steganography
and PDF files
conceal messages in ASCII text by appending
Snow
Steganography
whitespace
ncovert
TCP Covert Tunnel hide network file transfers across the Internet

Timestomp

Time Stamp
Alteration

modifies the time attribute values for a file

Beast

Trojan

Backdoor program
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Source
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pr
oddocs/en-us/attrib.mspx?mfr=true
http://www.fspro.net/hide-folders/
http://windows.microsoft.com/enUS/windows-vista/Show-hiddenfiles
http://www.hopster.com/
http://www.nocrew.org/software/ht
tptunnel.html
http://www.neophob.com/2007/10/
pingtunnel-for-windows-icmptunnel/
https://www.rootkit.com/vault/fuzen
_op/FU_README.txt
http://cheops-ng.sourceforge.net/
http://www.hoobie.net/brutus/
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pr
oddocs/en-us/ping.mspx?mfr=true
http://nmap.org/
http://steghide.sourceforge.net/
http://wbstego.wbailer.com/
http://www.darkside.com.au/snow/i
ndex.html
http://ncovert.sourceforge.net/
http://www.blackhat.com/presentati
ons/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-foster-liuupdate.pdf
http://h4ck3r.in/board/showthread.
php?tid=171

Table 46. CAMEL Attack Method Data Continued.

Attack Method Attack Action
Vanquish
User Rootkit
Hacker Defender User Rootkit

Attack Method Description
Source
Processes, Handles, Modules, Files & Folders, Registry
Values, Services
https://www.rootkit.com/vault/xshadow/ReadMe.txt
User rootkit to hide processes
http://www.rootkit.com/board_project_fused.php?did=proj5
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/ProductsHide processes, directories, registry, connections
View/63/Nuclear_Rootkit_1.0/

Nuclear

User Rootkit

Blue Pil
WebScarab

Virtualized Rootkit x86 virtualization rootkit
Web Application
Attack
Analyze HTTP applications

Samspade

Whois

http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2006/06/introducing-blue-pil .html
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Pro
ject
http://www.pcworld.com/downloads/file/fid,4709-order,1-page,1c,alldownloads/description.html

Network query tool
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Appendix D. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data
Table 47. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data.
Attack Action /
Method
ICMP Echo
requests
Samspade
nmap

Cheops-ng
Brutus

WebScarab
Netcat

Evidence
Forensic Tools Confidence Evidence Source

Forensic Marker
ICMP ping incoming
and outgoing
Wireshark
Ping, SMTP VFRY,
Wireshark
web site activity
Port scanning, OS
Wireshark
enum
Port scanning, OS
Wireshark
enum
Failed login attempts
in log
PyFlag

Malformed data
suspicious open
ports

Suspicious Trojan
Beast
activity
cmd: del
windows\prefetch
windows\prefetch missing
Hide Folders
2009
Hidden folders

Folder hidden
option

Hidden folders

File hidden option Hidden files
Steghide

H
M
H

M
H

Wireshark

H

netstat

H

Regedit.exe

H

cmd

H

cmd

L

cmd

L

cmd

L

Suspicious files/sizes Stegdetect
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H

http://www.wireshark.org/
http://majorgeeks.com/Sam_S
pade_d594.html
http://nmap.org/
http://cheopsng.sourceforge.net/screenshots
.php
http://www.webhostgear.com/
240.html
http://www.owasp.org/index.p
hp/Category:OWASP_WebS
carab_Project
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/library/bb490947.aspx
http://www.exterminateit.com/malpedia/removebeast#howfiles

http://www.fspro.net/hidefolders/
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
x
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
x
http://www.outguess.org/detec
tion.php

Table 48. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued.
Attack Action /
Method

Forensic
Marker
Suspicious
files/sizes
Suspicious
files/sizes

Evidence
Forensic Tools Confidence Evidence Source
http://www.garykessler.net/libr
wbStego4open
Hashkeeper
M
ary/fsc_stego.html
http://www.outguess.org/detec
Snow
Stegdetect
H
tion.php
Streams,
ADSTools,
Suspicious
http://technet.microsoft.com/enADS Scanner,
cmd: type
L
files/sizes
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
ADS Spy
Streams,
ADSTools,
Suspicious
http://technet.microsoft.com/enADS Scanner,
cmd: cp
L
files/sizes
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
ADS Spy
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
cmd: attrib +h
Hidden files
cmd
H
x
http://www.microsoft.com/res
ources/documentation/window
Suspicious time dir c:\ /A /S
s/xp/all/proddocs/enTimestomp
M
MACE values /T:W
us/ntcmds.mspx?mfr=true
Recuva, File
http://www.kleinsoft.co.za/pro
ZeroTracks
Files removed Scavenger
M
ducts.html
http://windows.microsoft.com/
Evidence
Recuva, File
en-US/windows7/RecoverFiles removed Scavenger
M
Eliminator
lost-or-deleted-files
http://windows.microsoft.com/
Recuva, File
en-US/windows7/RecoverTracks Eraser Pro Files removed Scavenger
M
lost-or-deleted-files
Missing/incomple
http://technet.microsoft.com/enAuditPol
Event Viewer H
te logs
us/library/cc766042.aspx
http://www.microsoft.com/res
ources/documentation/window
s/xp/all/proddocs/enDisable EventLog Disabled
us/cpanel_admintools.mspx?m
H
service
EventLog service Services
fr=true
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Table 49. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued.
Attack Action /
Method

Forensic
Marker

Evidence
Eliminator

Missing/incom
Event Viewer
plete logs

H

WinZapper

Missing/incom
Event Viewer
plete logs

H

ClearLogs
Vanquish

Fu

DNS2TCP

Iodine
Iodine

DNSCat

TCP-over-DNS
ICMP Covert
Channel

Forensic Tools

Missing/incom
Event Viewer
plete logs
VANQUISH.
RootkitRevealer
DLL

Hacker Defender hxdef.exe

Nuclear

Evidence
Confidence

H

http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-US/windows7/Recoverlost-or-deleted-files
http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aa385780(v=vs.85).
aspx
http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aa385780(v=vs.85).
aspx
http://www.rootkit.com/newsr
ead.php?newsid=35
http://www.carnal0wnage.com
/papers/rootkit_for_the_masse
s.pdf
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.
com/ProductsScreenshot/63/Nuclear_Rootk
it_1.0/

H

[DBM09]

H

http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/o
utils/dns2tcp/index.html.en

H
H

RootkitRevealer

H

c:\WINDOWS
RootkitRevealer
\nkit.dll
RootkitRevealer, FPspCidTable Secure Blacklight
suspicious
traffic over
Wireshark
port 53
suspicious
traffic over
Wireshark
port 53
TAP32 driver cmd
suspicious
DNS, Java
1.4+ installed Wireshark
suspicious
traffic over
Wireshark
port 53
suspicious
ICMP traffic Wireshark
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Evidence Source

H
H

H

H
H

http://www.securitywire.com/

http://tadek.pietraszek.org/proj
ects/DNScat/
http://analogbit.com/tcp-overdns_howto
http://www.cs.uit.no/~daniels/
PingTunnel/

Table 50. CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued.
Attack Action
Forensic Marker Forensic Tools
/ Method
ptunnel.exe on
ptunnel
cmd/search
system

Evidence
Confidence
M

ptunnel

WinPCap installed cmd/search

H

ncovert

SIN as data field
Suspicious HTTP
traffic
Suspicious HTTP
traffic

Wireshark

H

Wireshark

H

Wireshark

H

Wireshark

H

Wireshark

H

Wireshark

H

ICPMTX

Suspicious activity
Suspicious ICMP
traffic
Suspicious ICMP
traffic
Suspicious ICMP
traffic

Wireshark

H

Alureon

Suspicious activity RootkitRevealer

H

Blue Pill
AFX Windows
RootKit
DNS Covert
Tunnel

Suspicious activity cmd

L

Hopster
httptunnel
rcovert
Hans
Skeeve

Suspicious activity
Suspicious traffic
over port 53
Suspected Rootkit
Rootkit
Activity
Alternate Data System search for
Stream
all active ADS

RootkitRevealer

H

Wireshark
H
RootkitRevealer, F-Secure
H
Blacklight
Streams, ADSTools, ADS
H
Scanner, ADS Spy
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Evidence Source

http://www.neophob.com/2007/
10/pingtunnel-for-windowsicmp-tunnel/
http://www.blackhat.com/presen
tations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03simplenomad/bh-us-03simplenomad.pdf
http://www.hopster.com/
http://www.nocrew.org/software
/httptunnel.html
http://rfakeap.tuxfamily.org/#Ra
w_Covert
http://code.gerade.org/hans/
http://www.grayworld.net/poc_skeeve.shtml
http://thomer.com/icmptx/
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.
com/2006/06/introducing-bluepill.html
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445
http://www.wireshark.org/

http://www.pointstone.com/prod
ucts/ADS-Scanner/

Appendix E. CAMEL Tool and Method Data
Table 51. CAMEL Tool and Method Data.
Forensic
Tool
Tool/Method Confidence

Tool/Method Source

Wireshark

H

http://www.wireshark.org/

Wireshark

H

http://www.wireshark.org/

Port scanning, OS enum Wireshark

H

http://www.wireshark.org/

Port scanning, OS enum Wireshark
Failed login attempts in
PyFlag
log
Malformed data
Wireshark

H
H
H

http://www.wireshark.org/
http://www.pyflag.net/cgibin/moin.cgi
http://www.wireshark.org/

M

http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pro
ddocs/en-us/netstat.mspx?mfr=true

H

http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pro
ddocs/en-us/tools_regeditors.mspx

Forensic Marker
ICMP ping incoming
and outgoing
Ping, SMTP VFRY,
web site activity

suspicious open ports

netstat

Suspicious Trojan
Regedit.exe
activity
\windows\system32\con
cmd
fig missing
windows\prefetch
cmd
missing
Suspicious files/sizes
Hidden folders

Stegdetect
cmd

H
H
http://www.outguess.org/detection.p
hp

H
H

Suspicious files/sizes

StegSpy

H

Suspicious files/sizes
Hidden files
Suspicious time
Modified, Access, and
Creation values
Files removed

Hashkeeper
cmd

M
H

dir c:\ /A /S
/T:W
Recuva

H
M

http://www.spyhunter.com/stegspydownload.htm
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/domex/
hashkeeper.htm

http://www.piriform.com/recuva
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Table 52. CAMEL Tool and Method Data Continued.

Forensic Marker

Forensic
Tool/Method

Tool
Confidence

VANQUISH.DLL

RootkitRevealer

H

hxdef.exe
RootkitRevealer
c:\WINDOWS\nkit.dll,
c:\WINDOWS\Rootkit.
RootkitRevealer
exe

H

PspCidTable
suspicious traffic over
port 53
suspicious ICMP traffic
ptunnel.exe on system
WinPCap installed
SIN as data field

H

Tool/Method Source
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445

RootkitRevealer

H

Wireshark
Wireshark
cmd/search
cmd/search
Wireshark

H
H
M
H
H

http://www.wireshark.org/
http://www.wireshark.org/

Suspicious HTTP traffic Wireshark
Suspicious activity
Wireshark

H
H

Suspicious activity
Suspicious traffic over
port 53
Suspicious traffic over
port 53

RootkitRevealer

H

http://www.wireshark.org/
http://www.wireshark.org/
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445

Wireshark

H

http://www.wireshark.org/

Wireshark

H

RootkitRevealer

H

http://www.wireshark.org/
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445

Suspicious activity
Streams will examine the
files and directories for
streams
Searches drives & lists
all files that have ADS
System search for all
active ADS
List, view or delete
Alternate Data Streams
(ADS)

http://www.wireshark.org/

Streams

M

ADSTools

M

ADS Scanner

M

http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
http://www.soft32.com/download_
207535.html
http://www.pointstone.com/product
s/ADS-Scanner/

M

http://www.brothersoft.com/adsspy-74079.html

ADS Spy
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Table 53. CAMEL Tool and Method Data Continued.

Forensic Marker

Forensic
Tool/Method

Tool
Confidence

Suspected Rootkit activity RootkitRevealer
H
Suspected Rootkit activity F-Secure Blacklight H
deleted files
deleted files

Tool/Method Source
http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/sysinternals/bb897445

http://www.quetek.com/prod02.htm
Recycle Bin
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Appendix F. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics
Table 54. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics.

Attack Action
Reconnaissance
Ping
Whois
Scanning
Port Scanning
Network Mapping
Gain Access
Password Attack
Web Application
Attack
Maintain Access
Backdoor
Trojan
Covering Tracks
Log Obfuscation
Attack Data
Obfuscation
Persistent Access
Obfuscation
Covert Channel
Hide Attack Data

Risk of Discovery
L
L
L
L
L
M
H
L

Impact
M
M
H
H
H
M
H
H

L
H
H
L
L
L

H
H
H
H
H
H

L

H

L
L
L

H
H
H

Alternate Data Stream L
Steganography
L
Time Stamp
Alteration
L
Hide Files/Folders
H
Delete Attack Files
L
Delete Prefetch
L
Delete Browsing
L
History
Delete Clipboard
Data
L

H
H
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H
M
M
M
M
M

Table 55. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Continued.

Attack Action
Delete Shell History
Delete "Recent"
History
Disable Auditing
Overwrite Logs
Fake Log Entries
Delete Log Entry
Add Log Entry
Erase Logs
Erase System Logs
Erase Application
Logs
Erase Security Logs
Rootkit
Kernel Rootkit
User Rootkit
Application Rootkit
Virtualized Rootkit
Firmware Rootkit
ICMP Covert
Channel
HTTP Covert
Channel
DNS Covert Channel
TCP Covert Tunnel

Risk of Discovery Impact
L
L
M
M
L
L
L
L
H
H

M
H
H
H
H
H
L
L

H
H
L
L
L
H
N/A
L

L
L
H
H
H
M
N/A
L

M

H

H
L
H

H
H
L

802.11 Covert Tunnel N/A
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N/A

Appendix G. CAMEL Creation Outline
CAMEL Creation Outline
Create and model the Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL). CAMEL is
comprised of attack actions, methods, metrics, evidence markers and the associated
forensic tools.
1. Gather attack action data
This is the attacker methodology detailed as a list of actions taken to achieve a
goal action.
a. Name of action
b. Parent action
c. Child action
d. Attack results
e. Other (Attack vector, etc.)
2. For each action collected, list all attack methods (tools, TTPs)
These are the methods used to create the action. This is the procedure to produce
the act.
a. Attack method
b. Attack Action for method
c. Attack category (Attack action method used for)
d. Attack method description
e. Attack method source
3. For each action and method, list all evidence which identify it
This is the detailed fingerprinting of what the act and/or method 'does' when it
transpires on the target system.
a. Name of evidence
b. Attack action/method the evidence identifies
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c. Forensic markers which will be collected
d. Source for evidence marker
4. For each evidence marker, list the associated tool to harvest the marker
This step details the forensic tools/TTPs which can collect the associated marker.
a. Name of forensic marker
b. Name of evidence it identifies
c. Forensic tool to collect marker
d. Source for forensic tool
5. Assign metrics to each attack action
Each action now has attack method, evidence and collection method data
associated with it. The capabilities of an action, as determined by the
organization using CAMEL, can now be assigned as metrics.
a. Determine metrics for action
b. Assign values to metrics
6. Model the action, method, marker and metric in an attack tree
This is the graphical representation of the data collected in steps 1-5. This model
is referred to as the Cyber Attack Methodology Attack Tree (CAMAT).
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Appendix H. Test Systems Setup

Test_1
1. WinPCap 4.1.2 installed.
The program WinPcap is downloaded from http://www.winpcap.org/. Run the
installer file WinPcap_4_1_2.exe on the system (next, next, I agree, install).
2. ptunnel.exe used to create an ICMP tunnel to a receiving proxy previously
setup.
Download ptun-rel1.zip from http://www.neophob.com/2007/10/pingtunnel-forwindows-icmp-tunnel/ on both target and a designated proxy server. Running
ptunnel.exe -h will list help to include examples.
Server:
A separate system is designated as a server. This will act as the proxy, listening
for and handling the incoming ptunnel icmp packets. The server must run the following
command with the device changed to the specific device of the system.
ptunnel -v 4 -c "\Device\NPF_{EED408B.....}"
Client:
The victim system is the where the covert channel is installed and used to bypass
firewalls. The following command is run with options changed as appropriate:
ptunnel -p <SERVERIP> -lp 8000 -da <WEB-PROXY> -dp <PORT> -v 4
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ServerIP is the IP of the server listening for the connections.
Web-proxy is the web proxy of the local network.
Port is the port to be used on the client (80 for web)
Now a web browser can be set up to use the running ptunnel port as the proxy
server (127.0.0.1 for IP and the Port setup on the ptunnel command) connection for
internet access. SSH can also setup and used.
3. The FU rootkit used to hide the ptunnel.exe process.
Download the FU_rootkit from www.rootkit.com. Find the process ID (PID) of
the ptunnel.exe using Windows Task Manager. Run the following command on the
fu.exe file in the FU_rootkit EXE folder. This will hide the putnnel.exe process.
fu -ph (PID)
4. Evidence Eliminator used to clear the event logs of any trace of these actions.
Download the Evidence Eliminator version 6.03 tool from http://www.evidenceeliminator.com/downloads.d2w. The install file downloaded will be called insteelmd.exe.
Run the install program agreeing (next, YES, next, finish). This will install Evidence
Eliminator on the system. Now run the program. This experiment assumes the retail
version of the software is purchased. This program will clear evidence of Recycle Bin,
Application Logs, Temp Files, Internet Explorer cache, and Clipboard data.
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Test_2
1. The EventLogs service disabled in the Administrator tool: Services.
The Administrator tool Services is used to change the Startup type of Event Log
to disabled. Figure 39 shows the option that is changed to disable the service.

Figure 39. Test_2 Setup Event Log Service.

2. Two Alternate Data Streams (ADS) created using the type cmd to hide
notional attack executable bad.exe in calc.exe.
A malicious program (in this case a renamed copied executable file from the
system) bad.exe is put in the alternate data stream of calc.exe. Then calc.exe is hidden in
notepad.exe thus creating two alternate data streams. The following commands are used.
138

type bad.exe > calc.exe:bad.exe
type calc.exe > notepad.exe:calc.exe
3. Two txt files created, deleted and 'emptied' from Recycle Bin.
Two text files, Company Sales Plan,txt and Company Secrets.txt are created with
notional data in the files. These files are then deleted. The Recycle Bin then ran the
"Empty Recycle Bin" option.
4. ZeroTracks used to remove browsing and recent file history.
The program SoftonicDownloader_for_zerotracks.exe is downloaded from the
site: http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com. The installer is executed, accepting and agreeing
to all install options. The installer then downloads the software for installation. The
Setup wizard then runs. The wizard is completed using all default selections (next and
install).
Once installed, the ZeroTracks program is run. The options in ZeroTracks
Windows Recent Docs and Internet Explorer Cache and History are used to clear
(remove selected items) suspect associated files. Figures 40 and 41 show the ZeroTracks
window used to delete the browsing and recent file history.
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Figure 40. Test_2 Setup Zero Tracks Clear Windows Recent Docs.

Figure 41. Test_2 Setup Zero Tracks Clear IE Cache & History.
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Test_3 Setup
1. Create secrets.txt file
For this step of the test setup, create a text file to hold data to be exfiltrated. In
this case, secrets.txt was created with notional data in the file.
2. Use steghide-0.5.1-win32 to hide secrets.txt into winter.jpg.
Use the program steghide-0.5.1-win32, retrieved from
http://steghide.sourceforge.net to hide the secrets.txt file in a jpg file. In this case the file
Winter.jpg file was used. The following steghide command was used.
steghide embed -cf Winter.jpg -ef secrets.txt
A passphrase was given and secrets.txt was embedded into Winter.jpg via the
steganography tool steghide.
3. Use timestomp.exe to modify time value of winter.jpg to Monday 1/1/2001
01:01:01 AM
Timestomp was downloaded from
http://www.metasploit.com/data/antiforensics/timestomp.exe. The following command
was executed using the timestomp tool to modify Winter.jpg file time attributes.
timestomp Winter.jpg -z "Monday 1/01/2001 01:01:01 AM"
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